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ABSTRACT
Two sets of experiments were run to examine how a pilot's
mental workload might be measured, and how these measures are
affected by continuous manual-control activity versus discrete
assigned mental tasks, including the length of time between
receiving an assignment and executing it.
/
A fixed-base flight simulator was used, consisting of a Control
Box, a high resolution CRT, and a PDP/11 computer. The Control Box
contained a joy-stick, throttle, and all the switches and controls
necessary for operating the simulator aircraft's electronic and
mechanical systems. The Control Box inputs were fed to the PDP/11
computer. The computer used these inputs, the current state of the
aircraft, and pre-programmed aircraft dynamics to update the
aircraft's state and drive the CRT display. Aircraft dynamics were
modeled on a Lockheed Jetstar business jet. The CR1 display
consisted of a forward, "out the window" perspective view and a
cockpit instrument/indicator presentation.
The first experiment evaluated the strengths and weaknesses of
measuring mental workload with an objective performance measure
(altitude deviations) and five subjective ratings (Activity Level,
Complexity, Difficulty, Stress, and Workload). Volunteer pilots
flew a high intensity, manual-control mission and a high mental
workload mission. Each mission type was flown over two different
ground tracks. A method of activity analysis was developed for
calculating relative mental and physical workloads and was found
useful for like types of work, but unsuitable for directly comparing
mental workload to physical workload.
In this experiment, overall subjective workloads were judged to
be only moderate. Altitude deviations were greater for the high
mental workload scenario although pilot subjective ratings were
greater (more difficult) for the manual activity scenario. Mental
workload appeared to reduce the pilots' ability to control their
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altitude. Subjective ratings for the two scenarios were different,
but their respective altitude deviations were similar.
The second set of experiments built upon the first set by
increasing workload intensities and adding another performance
measure: airspeed deviation. The pilots flew a low workload
"Baseline" scenario, a high manual workload "Activity" scenario, a
high mental workload "Planning" scenario, and a high manual and
mental workload "Combined" scenario.
The degree of mental tasking had no impact on the magnitude of
airspeed or altitude deviations. Five types of subjective ratings
were elicited from the pilots. These proved different for the
Activity scenario, less distinct for the Planning scenario, and
almost indistinct for the very high workload Combined scenario.
Relative to the Baseline scenario's subjective ratings, the
incremental ratings for the Activity scenario plus those for the
Planning scenario, equalled those for the Combined scenario. For
the high manual workload scenario, all of the pilots gave similar
subjective ratings. However, some pilots found the high mental
workload scenario much more difficult than others did. Although
altitude or airspeed deviations and subjective ratings did not
correlate at moderate workloads, they did correlate at a high
workload level.
The number of mental tasks had little impact on the percentage
of mental tasks performed improperly. However, the level of manual
activity had a decisive effect. High manual workloads resulted in a
high mental task error percentage.
Although altitude deviations, airspeed deviations, and
subjective ratings were similar for both low experience and high
experience pilots, the low experience pilots had many more mental
task errors.
The length of time from receiving a mental task to executing it
had no effect on the likelihood that the task would be performed
properly.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
My eight years and 2500 flight hours as a United States Air
Force pilot kindled interests in aircraft cockpit design and the
dangers of pilots operating near the limits of their mental and
physical capabilities. The T-37, T-38, T-39, and B-52 aircraft
which I had the privilege to fly, had cockpits designed in the late
1940fs to the early 1960's. Over the years, aircraft modifications
had resulted in some equipment and operating procedures which made a
pilot's already demanding task even more difficult. The human
factors community and the aerospace industry were aware of the
problem and set out to use new technologies to lessen the pilot's
workload.
Cockpit design practices of the last 15 years share a common
thread: the degree and complexity of automation is increasing and
accelerating. Current state-of-the-art designs such as the Boeing
757, 767, and Airbus Industries A310 have radically changed flight
deck activities. Future designs, such as the U.S. Air Force's
proposed Advanced Technology Fighter and the Navy's Advanced Combat
Aircraft will demand far greater levels of automation because of the
requirement to operate in an extremely hostile, changing environment.
Expert systems and artificial intelligence will reduce or
eliminate certain types of pilot workload. However, in some
instances they may simply change the type of workload. Pilots are
operating less as manual controllers and more as supervisory
controllers.
1.1 SUPFJIVISORY CONTROL AND MENIAL WORKLOAD
The "supervisory control" model of operator behavior describes
the operator's role in planning, programming, monitoring, and
intervening as necessary in some process [23]. For this portion of
a pilot's workload, he monitors equipment and makes decisions.
The increased time and effort expended in monitoring aircraft
equipment has raised concerns that in automating aircraft we may be
raising the pilot's mental workload to unacceptable levels (or
conversely, lowering it to undesirable levels). Thus, there is
great interest in measuring this mental workload. However,
measurement implies some level of understanding of the process. The
degree in which one understands a process is often demonstrated by
16
the sophistication and accuracy of the "models" used to describe it.
1.2 MENTAL WORKLOAD MODELS
One widely accepted and useful model of the human operator was
proposed by Jens Rasmussen [18]. His model (Figure 1) separated
operator actions into three types of behavior: Skill-based behavior;
Rule-based behavior; and Knowledge-based behavior.
Skill-based behavior pertains to conventional manual-control
type tasks. The pilot combines his sensory inputs with his internal
model of the aircraft's systems and certain rules or parameters to
initiate some action. His senses supply feedback in a closed-loop
control system to operate the aircraft's systems. Various
optimal-control models have successfully predicted operator
performance for these behaviors [13].
Rule-based behavior relates to various procedural activities
such as deciding to lower the landing gear or initiate
communications with Air Traffic Control (ATC). The pilot observes
the state of his aircraft and its systems, associates those states
with certain tasks, and decides upon some action based on his
internally generated plans and stored rules. Fuzzy set models have
been used to model this activity [26].
Knowledge-based behavior is the process of planning and making
judgements. Using the information available to him and internal
goals, the pilot plans how to perform the-task. This plan is formed
using rules pertaining to the task, and results in performing some
action. This behavior is pictured as the outermost control loop,
and typically embodies the slowest flow of information.
Jensen and Chappell [9], in their study on "Pilot Performance
and Workload Assessment", found it necessary to modify Rasmussen's
model. They felt that the Monitoring function was sufficiently
different from Rasmussen's concepts of Rule-based or Skill-based
activities to warrant designating it a separate category.
Sheridan and Simpson [24] used Rasmussen's model of the human
operator to describe a pilot's task (Figure 2). Aircraft Systems
and Environmental Factors such as turbulence, ATC requirements, and
requests input into the pilot model. Within the pilot model, note
that supervisory mental work is primarily a Rule-based process
requiring short-term planning and memory (less than or equal to
60 seconds). However, the supervisory functions of planning and
intervening relate to the higher level knowledge-based workload.
Other models deal with different aspects of the mental workload
problem. Queuing theory is used to model the pilot as a discrete
17
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data sampler who establishes several event queues to accomplish
required tasks. Thus, the cockpit is a "multi-queue" environment
and forces the pilot to rotate his concern from one task to another,
allocating attention as necessary. When a pilot is busy, tasks
begin to pile up, the queue lengthens, and performance theoretically
degrades. This degradation occurs for several reasons. There are
delays in accomplishing tasks. There is also an increased
probability of task interruption due to the arrival of higher
priority tasks. Or, some tasks may be omitted because queue size
exceeds the pilot's short-term memory [3, 21, 28].
This limited short-term memory capacity of the human operator
is directly addressed by models which describe the human as a
limited capacity information channel. The fact that people have a
limited memory capacity has been known for centuries. However, G.
A. Miller [17] first put this fact into information theory terms in
1956. He pointed out that stimuli which varied from one another
with respect to only one attribute, could consistently be assigned
to no more than seven categories without error. Others have shown
that information transmission rate is limited. Figure 3 illustrates
one information channel model [22].
The limits of the human operator as an information channel have
three important aspects. First, there are absolute limits to a
person's capacity to both remember and transmit information.
Forgetting, lack of understanding, and memory saturation result in a
loss of information. Second, some parallel processing can be
carried out for coordinated tasks, but to do several independent
tasks requires switching among them. This requires multi-queue
mental processing models. Third, when working at capacity, one can
increase speed only at the expense of accuracy, and conversely.
A common prediction is that task performance will decline as
mental workload increases beyond a certain point. In its most
general form, predicted task performance is believed to be a
function of mental workload, and can be pictured as a series of
curves remarkably similar to a coefficient of lift versus angle of
attack plot for airfoils (Figure 4). It is also commonly asserted
that, as shown in Figure 4, increased operator skill results in
increased performance at a given level of mental activity, or
decreased mental work for a given performance level.
Sheridan and Simpson [24] theorized that when heavy workload
forced a pilot to choose tasks and allocate his attention, "...the
non-task-specific short-term planning or 'supervisory' component of
mental work increases..." This increases the pilot's uncertainty,
anxiety, and generalized stress. Under such circumstances, "...the
pilot's skilled behavior will be compromised."
20
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1.3 DEFINING AND PREDICTING MENTAL WORKLOAD
The greatest problem in trying to find ways to minimize mental
workload is simply trying to measure or quantify it. Measuring
physical workload is relatively straightforward. One can measure
calories expended, numbers or rates of movements, forces exerted,
pulse rate, blood pressure, et cetera. However, it is difficult to
measure something which is poorly defined, and there has been
disagreement over what constitutes mental workload.
After an extensive literature review, Williges and Wierwille
[31] stated that there is no agreed upon definition of mental
workload, nor single, universal metric of it. "Mental workload is a
theoretical construct, and as such might best be defined
operationally." Systems Engineers, Psychologists, and Physiologists
all have their own methods of defining and measuring mental workload.
Given that there is disagreement about the definition of mental
workload, there is a further problem: prediction. Predicting mental
workload is important to the designer, but it is just as important
to the investigator. The measurement of an unknown and poorly
defined quantity may produce misleading results. Several predictive
techniques have been used and are helpful, but are not definitive.
Cockpit Activity Timelines (CATs) are used extensively to
quantify physical workload. CATs break down activities into
discrete physical actions such as "reaching 6 inches over head", or
"pressing button". However, not all cockpit tasks are identifiable
or measurable. For example, how does one deal with "decide to
request a change of flight plan from ARICC"?
There is also some degree of arbitrariness in detail. One CAT
may say, "lower landing gear". Another may say, "reach 18 inches
forward and 6 inches left; grasp landing gear handle; lower handle;
bring hand back to throttle; wait for landing gear warning light to
go out, warning horn to silence, and hydraulic pressures to
stabilize".
Finally, CATs are not as precise as they seem to be. Time of
execution, for example, will vary with the individual pilot, the
pilot's mood, instantaneous workload, et cetera. However, given all
these drawbacks, CATs have been useful for rough estimates of
physical effort requirements and are widely used.
Task Precedence Maps (TPMs) are also widely employed. TPMs are
a schedule of events. .They delineate the occurence of physical
events and the beginning or end of some task as a function of time.
They are most useful for a macroscopic analysis of activities.
One problem with using these techniques to predict mental
workload was pointed out by Hart and Bortolussi: "the workload
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associated with a complex task may be considerably different than
would be predicted by combining the workloads of the component
tasks." [5] Another problem is that mental workload is not simply a
function of the aircraft or procedures; it is also a function of the
pilot.
1.4 MENTAL TASK CHARACTERISTICS
Given these problems, what are the characteristics of mental
tasks? Mental tasks will arrive at random times. There will be
uncertainty associated with some tasks: for example, must, should,
how, or can one do the task? Different tasks have different
priorities. Finally, some tasks require a specific sequence of
processes.
Sheridan and Simpson further classified tasks into categories.
[24] There are non-deferrable or pre-emptive tasks. These are
usually operating tasks requiring immediate action such as turning
on a piece of equipment or manipulating flight controls. However,
they may also be mental tasks such as responding to an ARTCC request
for information. Next, there are tasks which can be deferred for a
short period of time (less than 60 seconds). These relate to
monitoring activities, such as a pilot's instrument scan. Finally,
there are tasks which are deferrable for more than 60 seconds, which
in turn involve planning tasks such as deciding when, how, or
whether to take some future action.
1.5 MEASURING MENTAL WORKLOAD: SUBJECTIVE MEASURES
How can one measure mental workload given these problems and
uncertainties? Subjective Rating Scales (SRSs) have been used
successfully by a large number of researchers. Two major reasons
for selecting a subjective scale are: (1) mental events are not
directly measurable; and (2) a person may compensate for increasing
workload demand by increasing effort, thereby holding "objective"
performance constant.
In choosing a subjective system, Sheridan and Simpson [24]
decided to modify an already existing SRS: the Cooper-Harper Scale.
The Cooper-Harper Scale has been used for many years by test pilots
to evaluate aircraft handling. It rates handling qualities on a
ten-point scale from Uncontrollable to Acceptable-Satisfactory (good
enough without improvement). Like Cooper-Harper, Sheridan and
Simpson separated a ten-point scale into four divisions: (1)
impossible; (2) unacceptable; (3) unsatisfactory, but acceptable;
and (4) satisfactory. Divisions 2, 3, and 4 were further divided
into three subdivisions.
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As a separate scaling effort, they suggested three main
attributes to mental workload: (1) task time constraints; (2) task
uncertainty and complexity of planning; and (3) psychological
stress. This resulted in a three-dimensional scale. Each dimension
had its own ten point scale with similar divisions.
Concerning SRSs, Rehmann, Stein, and Rosenberg [20] reported
that "...these measures are often sensitive and provide meaningful
data to the investigator." An investigation by Casali and kLerwille
[2] on the value of 16 different techniques for estimating the pilot
workload imposed by communications, reported that a modified
Cooper-Harper scale reliably discriminated between low- and
high-workload scenarios and between low- and medium-workload
scenarios.
However, SRSs have some weaknesses. Katz [12] found in his
study on "Pilot Workload in the Air Transport Environment" that
"Perceived workload is not equivalent to performance." In that
study, performance was judged on the magnitude of glideslope and
localizer deviations on a simulated ILS approach. In addition,
Williges and Wierwille [31] pointed out several other problems.
First, the subject may confuse mental workload with physical
workload in making the evaluation. Or, the subject may not be aware
of the degree of mental loading. Also, subjective ratings are a
function of emotional state, experience, learning, and natural
abilities (although objective measures also share these
influences).
Finally, post-flight interviews and questionnaires have proven
valuable when used for supportive information.
1.6 PHYSIOLOGICAL PARAMETER MEASUREMENTS
Physical Parameters (PPs) have also been measured in an attempt
to quantify mental workload. Casali and Wierwille [2] found that
changes in pupil diameter reliably reflected communications workload
differences between low- and medium-workload and low- and
high-workload senarios. Mostly however, physiological measurements
have been only marginally effective or completely ineffective in
determining mental workload. Eye blinks, eye fixations, respiration
rate, mean heart rate, heart rate standard deviation,
electroencephalograms, and pulse rate measurements have all been
evaluated and found wanting as practical measures of mental
workload. [2, 8]
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1.7 OBJECTIVE PERFORMANCE MEASURES
An extremely diverse assortment of objective measurement
techniques have been employed and evaluated. One technique measures
spare mental capacity. It assumes that the operator is a
limited-channel sampler and tries to measure the difference between
the operator's total workload capacity and the capacity needed to
perform a task.
Two mathematical models have been suggested for the human
operator. The task component/time summation model is essentially a
computer simulation of workload. The information-theoretic model
quantifies workload in terms of bits/second. Unfortunately, there
has been only limited validation tor either method.
Single primary task measures have been used with some success,
but they are generally insensitive at low workload levels. Multiple
primary task measures seek to overcome this limitation and provide a
more complete picture of behavior and performance. Wierwille and
Gutmann [30] found that a "...multivariate analysis of several
primary measures has been demonstrated superior to one measure."
Casali and Wierwille [2] had success using measurements of
errors of omission and commission. Errors of omission were valuable
for distinguishing bewtween low- and medium-workload and low- and
high-workload scenarios. Errors of commision were useful for
distinguishing medium- and high-workload and low- and high-workload
scenarios.
Several secondary task measures have also been extensively
investigated. The nonadaptive arithmetic/logic technique measures
performance on an arithmetic/logic task done during "free time".
However, it is intrusive, can modify primary task performance,
measures average instead of peak workload, and has not been found a
sensitive workload indicator. A nonadaptive secondary tracking task
technique has also been tried, but exhibits the same problems as the
arithmetic/logic technique. Time estimation has been used with some
success. However, it is only a relative, not an absolute measure.
Nevertheless, Kantowitz, Hart, and Bortolussi [11] found that it "is
possible to use an objective secondary task as an index of pilot
workload..." especially if a synchronous secondary task "...occurs
less frequently but coincident with critical events."
Adaptive arithmetic/logic and adaptive tracking techniques have
been investigated, but they are limited to laboratory use because of
equipment and safety considerations.
An occlusion technique which systematically provides or denies
the pilot given amounts of data has been tried by several
investigators with some success. However, it is intrusive, raises
safety concerns in a non-laboratory environment, and is not very
25
sensitive.
Although various objective workload techniques have been used
for many years and been successful in measuring physical workload,
Kantowitz, Hart, and Bortolussi [11] pointed out that it has been
far more difficult to achieve a useful objective measure of pilot
mental workload than to find a useful subjective rating scale. One
reason is that there is a great deal of "noise" inherent in these
measures. Jensen and Chappell [9] said that although skill-based
activities are easy to measure, the measurements can be difficult to
interpret. Operators (or pilots) will often induce small errors to
act as test signals and thereby gain additional information on
system performance (pilot acting as a closed-loop control system).
Furthermore, the definition of a "significant" deviation
becomes important. There is the possibility that the pilot may
recognize a deviation and correct it before it reaches the
"significant" level. In a system with high inertia, this may allow
significant errors to go undetected. Thus, the actual error rates
might be much higher than the reported or measured rates.
In addition, there is an accumulator effect. The pilot can act
like a workload accumulator, maintaining a given performance level
by working harder as the difficulty level increases. Individuals
also set an arbitrary "acceptable" level of performance based on
their own utilities. This level is normally short of their
capacity, allowing "slack" for random or unusual events. Thus,
until they near their performance limit, they can maintain similar
performance levels by simply working harder, (see Figure 4)
Finally, objective measures may be insensitive across persons.
That is, two people may show similar performance although one may be
working much harder.
1.8 COMBINED MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE
In their study of mental workload, Tanaka, Sheridan, and
Buharali [25] examined some implications of Rasmussen's behavioral
model. They hypothesized that since skill-based, rule-based, and
knowledge-based behaviors were different processes, they should >
cause different kinds of mental workload. Similarly, Johannsen [8]
pointed out that there is a general consensus that mental workload
has behavioral, performance, physiological, and subjective aspects.
The result is that trying to measure mental workload with one
measure is similar to trying to measure a swimmer's total energy
output by instrumenting one arm muscle.
Thus, a number of researchers have proposed using several
measures simultaneously. As Williges and Wierwille put it, "Because
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of the multidimensionality of workload,- it appears unlikely that any
single measure will ever suffice completely." 131] (also see
Leplat [14])
This multi-measurement approach has been used quite
successfully. In one instance, Hicks and Wierwille [8] compared a
number of mental workload assessment procedures for a driving
simulator and found that, "...primary task measures and (subjective)
rating scale measures...should be used in assessing driver workload,
particularly if it is of a psychomotor nature."
However, although there is a general consensus that multiple
measures are useful, applying this technique has not been uniformly
successful. Attempting to explain inconsistencies in previous work,
Kantowitz, Hart, and Bortolussi [11] theorized that "Perhaps one
reason that objective and subjective workload data are
'de-correlated' may be that average and peak measures are being
compared inadvertently." They then went on to demonstrate that
properly designed objective and subjective measurement techniques
could show congruous results.
1.9 GENERAL CAVEATS ,
There is one overriding caveat for the researcher, designer, or
engineer who examines mental workload or applies the results of
studies. As Sheridan and Simpson [24] put it, "...in the real world
the subjective utilities of high performance on certain tasks may be
considerably different than those found in the safety of an aircraft
simulator." Although this fact is important in measuring physical
performance, its relevance to the mental workload case is multiplied
several times over because of the nature of mental workload.
Investigators also must deal with another "noise" source in any
attempt to measure or analyze mental workload. Pilot errors are
often used as indicators of workload level. However, pilot errors
also induce additional workload. Hart and Bortolussi [5]
investigated this problem in 1983. They reported that "...pilot
errors...can alter the nature of the tasks that the pilot actually
performs so that the workload experienced is substantially different
from the workload that was intentionally imposed." Two significant
results of their study were: "...errors are considered to be a
significant source of workload and stress by experienced pilots";
and "...the pilots felt that the impact of errors on subsequent
performance is very negative."
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1.10 PROBLEMS TO BE ADDRESSED
I have examined the uncertainties In the model and definition
of mental workload, the difficulties in measuring this workload, and
the problems inherent in performing this research in a laboratory.
Given all the previous qualifiers, this study will address several
issues. .
-
 :
 First, can mental workload be measured in a consistent,
.sensitive, and meaningful way? This issue was the thrust of an
initial set of experiments which are described in detail in
Chapter 3.
Second, is there a time-sensitive element in the mental
workload indigenous to the aircraft flight deck? This question was
examined in a second set of experiments, discussed in detail in
Chapters 4 and 5.
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Chapter 2
EXPERIMENTAL SET UP
; 2.1 GENERAL CONFIGURATION AND EQUIPMENT
Figure 5 pictures the laboratory flight simulator environment
for this project. The volunteer pilot subjects manipulate controls
and switches on a control box while getting aircraft state
information from a MEGATEK cathode ray tube (CRT) display. The
MEGATEK displays flight instruments, aircraft and equipment
configuration, and a forward perspective view. The investigator has
his own video display terminal (VDT) and keyboard for controlling
the system.
Figure 6 is a diagram of the information flow for the set up.
The pilot gets his visual information from the MEGATEK CRT and
manipulates controls and switches on the control box. The
'investigator gets program status information on his VDT and directs
commands to the Computer via a Keyboard. Control Box signals are
fed to a PDP/11 Computer. The Computer's simulation program (see
Appendix 1) takes the present aircraft state information, Control
Box inputs, and the investigator's Keyboard commands to determine
aircraft dynamics and a new aircraft state. The information is used
to update the MEGATEK and VDT displays.
The basic aircraft dynamics were developed over a 12 month
period by Keiji Tanaka. A great deal of experimental trial and
error went into making the simulator's response as close as possible
to the response of an actual aircraft. A number of pilots came to
the lab, flew the simulator, and evaluated its handling qualities.
Eventually, the simulation fidelity was brought to a high level,
including realistic stall characteristics. I further modified the
aircraft dynamics to make the flight controls slightly less
sensitive and to improve the simulator's landing characteristics.
The Computer stores all Control Box switch or control
manipulations and stores aircraft state data every 10.0 seconds.
This data can be displayed on the investigator's VDT or printed out
on a Line Printer.
The MEGATEK CRT display is Shown in Figure 7. The upper
portion of the display shows a simplified, forward "out the window"
perspective of an airport and three runways. Below this is a set of
instruments in the familiar "T" pattern. An Airspeed Indicator,
Attitude Deviation Indicator (ADI) with Glideslope Deviation
Indicator (GSI), and Altimeter comprise the top row. A Horizontal
29
Experimenter
Pilot Volunteer
Line Printer
POP/11
Computer
Figure 5: The Laboratory Environment
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Situation Indicator (HSI) with the selected course (CRS) and
distance (DME) to a selected navigation aid is directly beneath the
ADI. A Verticle Velocity Indicator (WI) is to the right of the
HSI. Landing Gear Position (Up-Down), Flap Position (Up-Down),
; Thrust Setting, Stability Augmentation Selection (On-Off),
.;. Navigation Radio Selection (Off, VOR, ILS, channel number), Lateral
'.Autopilot Selection (Off, Manual Heading, VOR Course, Localizer
Course), and the Longitudinal Autopilot Selection (Off, Altitude
, Hold, Speed Hold, Altitude/Speed Hold, Glide Slope/Speed Hold) are
-also presented. . n; • •
V 'A drawing of the Control Box is shown in Figure 8. The subject
interprets the flight information displayed on the MEGATEK and
. manipulates the controls and switches on the Control Box to make the
"aircraft" respond in a desired fashion. The Control Box contains
an aircraft-type control-stick or joy-stick, a throttle, and a
number of other controls. On the top-rear of the box are eight
Radio Toggles. To the left of the Throttle are the Course Set Knob
and the Flaps and Landing Gear Selector. To the right of the
joy-stick is a longitudinal Trim Control. The front panel has six
. controls: Heading Set Knob; VOR/ILS Selector; Lateral Autopilot
r" Selector; Longitudinal Autopilot Selector; Radio-Navigation Channel
.Selector; and Stability Augmentation Selector. For information on
the lateral and longitudinal autopilot modes and the stability
augmentation mode, see Appendix 2.
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Figure 8: Layout of the Control Box for the flight simulator
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Chapter 3
.PRELIMINARY EXPERIMENT
3.1 SUBJECTS . . ; - . - . - ,
Since these experiments demanded pilots who had, at a minimum,
an instrument rating, I first recruited from M.I.T.'s resident
military pilot population. Four very experienced pilots volunteered
for the project. All four were Air Force officers. Two of the
pilots had flown the simulator during previous experiments and the
other two were given extensive training on the equipment before they
were moved into the experimental phase.
The following is a summary of their flying experience:
A: Fighter-Type: ......1250 Hours
; Jet: >............1250
Total: 1250
B: Fighter-Type: 3200
Jet: 2750
Total: 3200
C: Light Aircraft: 550
Fighter-Type: 1000
Heavy Aircraft: 600
Jet: ............1000
Total: 2150
D: Light Aircraft: 100
Fighter-Type: 700
Heavy Aircraft: 1300
Jet: 2000
Total: 2100
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3.2 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
Two different ground tracks were used in this set of
experiments. Figures 9 and 10 show the basic courses followed by
the two routes: alpha and beta. Alpha was a clockwise route while
beta was a counterclockwise route. Each pilot flew each route once
per session. Two different routes were used in order to minimize
the effects of transfering prior knowledge from one run to the next,
"learning" the scenario, and consciously or subconsciously
-' anticipating tasks.
Each route was flown in two versions. One version, labeled
"Activity", was loaded with a number of tasks to perform. Most of
these tasks were similar to the instruction, "Climb and maintain
4000". Such tasks exercise skill-based manual-control activity and
short-term memory. These tasks exercise short-term memory because,
in executing them, the pilot has to remember the particular
altitude, heading, or airspeed he is trying to reach while he
controls other parameters. The pilots were not allowed to use the
autopilot as an aid at any point in these initial experiments.
The second, or "Memory" version exercised long-term memory by
Instructing the pilots to take some action at a given time in the
future. An example of a long-term memory task is an instruction
such as. "Descend to 2000 at Point Delta" given about 10 minutes
prior to the aircraft arriving at Point Delta.
The two routes and two versions were counterbalanced between
and within subjects. Table 1 shows the order in which the four
subjects flew the four scenarios. Each subject flew only one
session per day and each session contained two runs. Each session
had runs exercising each of the two versions and each of the two
routes.
Table 1: Order in which each pilot flew each scenario
SCENARIO
Alpha Memory
Beta Memory
Alpha Activity
Beta Activity
PILOT
A
1
4
3
2
B
2
3
4
1
C
3
2
1
4
D
4
1
2
3
36
NPoint A: 021/15.0
021
VOR #1
W
s
5 nm
133*
Point C: 144/5.0 228'
Point B: 228/10.0
Figure 9: Alpha Route Navigational Chart
VOR #2
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NPoint D: 312/22.8
192
156
Point E: 156/6.7
W
225/15.9
S
5 nm
VOR #2
045'
Figure 10: Beta Route Navigational Chart
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"Navigation Charts" (see Figures 9 and 10) and note pads were
provided to enable the pilots to record instructions (as in real
flight). The Navigation Charts contained Navigation Aid positions,
point identifiers, and the courses, bearings, and distances to and
from various points.
Refering to Figure 9 for the alpha route, the pilots began by
heading 360 degrees at 5000 feet, five nautical miles (nm) due south
of VOR #1. After reaching VOR #1, they proceeded to Point A
(VOR #1: 021/15.0), VOR #2, Point B (VOR #2: 228/10.0), and Point C
(VOR #1: 144/5.0). The pilots then headed 045 degrees until
intercepting the Localizer for an ILS to Runway 36 (ILS 4). The
requirement to fly the entire route on instruments and perform
point-to-point navigation, holding, and ILS approaches demanded a
high level of pilot skill. (The "ceiling" was set at 1000 feet.
Therefore, the perspective display showed nothing until the pilots
"broke out" on short final.) The fact that the flights occured. in
a fairly small geographic area while flying at 200 + 25 knots meant
that at times things happened very quickly.
Figures 11, 12, 13, and 14 show the nominal ground tracks for
the four scenarios. Figure 11 is the nominal ground track for the
alpha route in its activity version. Note how ARTCC directed
headings result in significant ground track deviations from a direct
course. Figure 12 is the nominal ground track for the alpha route
in its memory version. Note that there are few deviations, and
thus, a much lower activity workload.
The differences between the task-loaded activity scenarios and
the mentally-loaded memory scenarios is best illustrated by
picturing the time histories of altitude, heading, and airspeed for
each. . • . ; • . .'.•,•-.-., . ' ' .' • •
Figures 15 and 16 illustrate the time versus airspeed profiles
for the alpha route. Note how the activity version has many more
(10 to 2) airspeed changes. For the beta route, the ratio is 7 to 1.
Figures 17 and 18 document the number of heading changes for
the two versions of the alpha route. The ratio of activity version
to memory version heading changes is 13 to 7. The ratio for the
beta route is 9 to 7.
Similarly, Figures 19 and 20 show the number of altitude
changes for the alpha route's two versions. Alpha's activity
scenario has 10 altitude changes while the memory version has 6
changes. For the beta route, the ratio is 10 to 5.
Every effort was made to make the total workloads of the alpha
and beta routes as similar as possible while making the mental
workload differences between the activity and memory versions as
different as possible.
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-. : Point A
VOR #1 VOR #2
Point B
Figure 11: Nominal Ground Track: Alpha Route; Activity Version
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Point A
VOR #1 VOR #2
Point B
Figure 12: Nominal Ground Track: Alpha Route; Memory Version
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VOR #1
Point E
VOR #2
Figure 13: Nominal Ground Track: Beta Route; Activity Version
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Point D
^> VOR #2
Point E
Figure 14: Nominal Ground Track: Beta Route; Memory Version
43
250-p
Commanded
Airspeed
(knots)
200
150 -•
10 15 20
Elapsed Time (minutes)
25 30
Figure 15: Commanded Airspeed for Alpha Route, Activity Version
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Commanded
Airspeed
150 -•
-f- 4-
10 15 20
Elapsed Time (minutes)
25 30
Figure 16: Commanded Airspeed for Alpha Route, Memory Version
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360
305 10 15 20
Elapsed Time (minutes)
Figure 17: Commanded Heading for Alpha Route, Activity Version
000
Commanded
Heading
(degrees)
180 •-
360
1 I
10 15 20
Elapsed Time (minutes)
30
Figure 18: Commanded Heading for Alpha Route, Memory Version
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10 15 20
Elapsed Time (minutes)
25 30
Figure 19: Commanded Altitude for Alpha Route, Activity Version
5000
Commanded
' ' ' ' ( ' ' ' ' I ' ' ' '
5 10 15 20
Elapsed Time (minutes)
Figure 20: Commanded Altitude for Alpha Route, Memory Version
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In an attempt to quantify the relative mental and physical
workloads, I decided to use a type of modified Cockpit Activity
Timeline. First, I calculated hypothetical mental and physical
Workload Unit (WU) histories for typical activities. I divided time
into 30 second blocks for these analyses.
For example, consider the activity "Climb 1000 feet". A pilot
must make note of the request and inform ARTCC that he is initiating
.the desired action. I assumed that this would take about 15
^seconds. Then, the pilot must climb 1000 feet. I used 1000 feet
per minute as an average baseline for climbs and descents. Finally,
the pilot was allotted 15 seconds for leveling off and making a
level off report. Thus, the entire process took 90 seconds and this
action was assigned three 30 second activity WU's.
In the process of performing this task, this activity was held
in the pilot's short-term memory queue for the 90 seconds required
for it. So,- the task was defined as a short-term memory task and
assigned three memory WU's.
For a long-term memory task, assume ARTCC directs "Report at
Point Delta". The pilot must register the request, confirm it with
ARTCC, and make some note of the requirement. This was worth one
activity WU. When reaching Point Delta, the pilot had to contact
ARTCC and make the required position report. This was assigned one
.activity WU. Therefore, the task generated one activity WU at the
time it was directed, and one activity WU at the time of execution.
When the pilot receives the request, he places it in a
long-term memory queue for monitoring over time. One hopes he
doesn't forget the task, but retains it in memory. Thus, this task
is given a series of mental WU's for each 30 second period between
receiving the request and fulfilling it. (This method begs the
question of whether memory actually functions in this manner. But,
I felt that this method would be useful for measuring relative
mental workload even if it did not accurately reflect absolute
mental workload levels.)
Each of the four scenarios was broken down into a series of
activity and memory tasks. Then, the WU time histories for these
tasks were combined to produce plots for mental WU's versus time and
activity WU's versus time. Figures 21 and 22 are plots derived for
both versions of the alpha route.
These plots are not too enlightening, but they were useful. 1
used them to sum workload units over time for the four scenarios,
and here differences were much more apparent.
Figure 23 shows the accumulated number of activity WU's as a
function of time. This graph shows that the physical workloads were
roughly equivalent for both routes' activity scenarios and both
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lOOf
80
Workload
Units
60
40
20 Alpha Activity
Beta Activity
Alpha Memory — —
Beta Memory
5 10 15 20
Elapsed Time (minutes)
Figure 23: Accumulated Activity Workload Units
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routes' memory scenarios. Also, the workload rate was similar for
both activity scenarios and both memory scenarios. Finally, note
the difference between the number of activity WU's for the memory
versus the activity scenarios.
Figure 24 is a similar plot, but shows memory WU's instead of
activity WU's. The same general comments apply as in the previous
paragraph, but note how here the memory scenarios have the higher
workload.
Figure 25 is a plot of the accumulated number of long-term
memory tasks over time for each scenario. Note that the memory
scenarios have roughly double the number of tasks as the activity
scenarios. Again, the plots for alpha and beta routes are similar,
and task rates are similar.
Figure 26 is a plot of the total number of memory tasks for
each scenario. Note that the total number and relative rates of
memory tasks were comparable for all four scenarios. However,
keeping in mind Figure 25, the activity scenarios had a higher
number of short-term memory tasks than the memory scenarios. These
short-term memory tasks were mainly associated with the many
activities within each scenario.
3.3 TRAINING AND INSTRUCTIONS
Before each session's data runs began, the volunteers spent 20
to 30 minutes flying the simulator. This practice consisted of
changing headings, altitudes and airspeeds, intercepting courses,
and making several ILS approaches.
When the pilots said they were ready and this investigator
agreed that their, performance appeared to have stabilized, they were
given "Navigational Charts" (Figures 9 and 10) to study and the
charts were fully explained to them. After any questions were
answered, each pilot was given a page of instructions.
Figure 27 is a reproduction of the instruction sheet given to
each subject. A few points deserve emphasis or explanation. The
pilots were instructed to fly as "precisely" as possible. Thus,
they were not told which aspect of their performance was being
scored. They had to assume that any deviation might count against
their performance. In addition, all simulated ARTCC instructions
were handled verbally between the subjects and experimenter.
In addition to the instructions, each pilot was given a
Subjective Rating Sheet (Figure 28) and a reference sheet (Figure
29) which explained "Workload" levels. The subjects were instructed
to consider each scale as continuous and to regard the subdivisions
solely as reference marks. A rating sheet was used for one day's
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Figure 24: Accumulated Memory Workload Units
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Figure 25: Accumulated Number of Long-term Memory Tasks
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Figure 26: Accumulated Total Number of Memory Tasks
53
The experiment you are participating In will provide information
on pilot workload. The experiment consists of four "flights"!
two now 3B4 two another day. On each day you will fly two
different ground tracks, terminating in an IIS approach. For
each flight, the nuaber of manual and mental tasks will be varied.
Your task is to fly as precisely as possible while following
instructions to the best of your ability.
Ignore any ATC statements or Instructions which appear on the
display. All instructions and ATC statements will be handled
verbally. However, when contacting a new "Controller", toggle
off (away) the old radio and toggle on (toward) the new channel.
Since all flights will be performed manually, you can Ignore the
two autopilot controls. In addition, the Trim and CHS switches
are best left as set.
You will use 3 Navigation aids: VQH 1, VOR 2, and US k.
ILS ** provides an ILS for Runway 36. Please note that the
signal is only received within 10 miles of the runway. So,
when on a dogleg to the ILS, hold heading until the Course
Deviation Bar comes off the stops or the Glide Slope Indicator
shows movement.
The "nominal'* airspeed for these runs is 200 kts. Final
approach will be flown at 150 kts. with Gear and Flaps down.
Usually, a throttle position near center will maintain a stable
airspeed.
You can expect the following level flight attitudes:
200 ktst Clean -2 deg
Flaps -5 deg
Gear & Flaps -2 deg
150 kts: Clean 0 deg
Flaps +2 deg
Gear A Flaps +6 deg
During and after each run, you will be asked to make several
subjective ratings. Thank you for your time and effort.
Figure 27: Pilot Instructions for the Preliminary Experiment
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Figure 28: Subjective Rating Sheet for the Preliminary Experiment
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activity: two runs. Volunteers were told that they would be asked
to make ratings three times during each run and were to mark a "1"
for their first rating, a "2" at their second rating, and a "3" at
their last rating. In addition, they were asked to place a "1" for
their overall rating at the end of each run. Thus, three times
during each run the simulation was halted and the subjects rated
Activity Level, Complexity, Difficulty, Stress, and'Workload.
Figure 29 provided a reference for rating the V/orkload level.
This modified Cooper-Harper system was adapted from earlier work by
Sheridan and Simpson [24]. The validity and utility of this system
was demonstrated by Katz [12].
The data runs were interrupted at 8 to 10 minutes and lb to 20
minutes elapsed time. These two periods and run termination were
used for ratings. After each run, the pilots were debriefed. They
were asked for verbal or written comments concerning their ratings,
performance, or actions.
3.4 DATA
Every 10 seconds, the computer stored aircraft x, y, and z
positions. In addition, it stored every control box manipulation
along with the magnitude and time of the event. This data provided
ground track information. By comparing elapsed time with a time
versus altitude profile, desired altitude was determined. Desired
altitudes were then compared with the aircraft's actual altitudes to
derive altitude error data. No altitude errors were computed during
directed climbs and descents.
Any one of a multitude of reasons might cause the actual ground
track to differ from the projected nominal ground track. For
example, one pilot might lead a turn more than another, or use a
slightly different course intercept heading. Therefore, ground
track deviations were not computed. However, all ground tracks were
plotted as a record of unusual activity, since major errors would
manifest themselves.
Altitude data was chosen as an objective measure rather than
airspeed data for several reasons. First, the altitude range was
far greater. Altitudes ranged from sea level to over 5000 feet.
Airspeeds ranged from 150 knots (kts) to 225 kts. Second, the range
of potential altitude deviations was greater than airspeed
deviations. Prior to flying the ILS, a pilot would need a deviation
of at least 1500 feet to crash. However, once configured at 150
kts, only a 20 kt deviation (130 kts) would be required to stall the
aircraft. Third, "anchoring" was available for all the desired
altitudes, but not all of the airspeeds. That is, all the altitudes
which the pilots were instructed to maintain resulted in the
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altitude indicator being coincident with a mark on a dial. However,
some airspeeds, such as 225 kts, resulted in placing the airspeed
indicator half way between two marks. Thus, it was easier to be
precise in interpreting present altitude than present airspeed.
This altitude error data was converted into Absolute Altitude
Error data (feet) and Root-Mean-Square (RMS) Altitude Error data
(feet). As mentioned earlier, the volunteer pilots were given no
clues about which parameters would be used to measure performance.
Finally, previous work by Katz [12] and others had determined
that no single subjective rating was an adequate mental workload
measure. So, each pilot made five Subjective Workload Ratings at
three points during each run. No ratings were made by independent
observers since previous work had shown that pilots proved to be as
reliable as observers in making these ratings. Activity Level,
Complexity, Difficulty, Stress, and Workload were rated. Ratings
were taken at three points rather than taking one overall rating to
see if any segment was "point" loaded relative to the others.
A combination, of subjective ratings and objective measures was
used for several reasons. First, mental workload is generally
agreed to be multi-dimensional in nature. Thus, multiple measures
should provide a more complete picture of operator behavior and
performance. Second, prior research attests to the importance and
necessity of combining objective and subjective data to derive
meaningful results. Hicks and Wierwille IB] stressed that both
measures "...should be used in assessing...workload, particularly if
it (the task) is of a psychomotor nature."
3.5 RESULTS
Table 2 lists the subjective ratings which the four pilots gave
during their "Activity" flights. Ratings are given for all five
subjective measures and each of the three rating periods. Alpha and
beta route ratings are also shown. Table 3 shows the same data, but
for the "Memory" flights. This information is summarized in Tables
4 and 5.
Student t-tests and F-tests were performed on the data. For
the activity version scenarios and the memory version scenarios,
there was no significant difference between the alpha or beta routes
at a 95 percent confidence level for any of the five subjective
categories. Either the design strategy was successful in minimizing
differences between the two routes, or these measures were not
sufficiently sensitive to demonstrate a difference.
For each of the four scenarios (for example, alpha/activity or
beta/memory), there was no significant difference in the ratings for
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Table 2: Activity version Subjective ratings
Point
Route
Activity
Level
Complexity
Difficulty
*
Stress
Workload
Subject
A
B
C
D
A
B
C
D
. A
B
C
D
A
B
C
D
A
B
C
D
1
a B
5.0 3.0
5.0 7.0
7.2 6.2
4.0 2.1
3.0 1.6
5.0 6.0
6.4 6.3
3.0 1.0
4.0 2.4
5.0 6.0
6.4 5.8
6.0 1.1
5.0 1.5
5.0 6.0
7.3 6.2
3.1 1.1
4.0 3.0
6.0 8.0
7.0 5.7
3:0 1.0
2
a B
3.0 5.0
4.0 5.0
6.4 4.6
5.0' 2.0
2.0 5.0
4.0 5.0
6.7 5.2
3.0 1.1
2.5 5.0
4.0 6.0
6.1 4.6
6.0 2.0
3.0 4.0
4.0 6.0
6.3 5.3
3.2 1.1
3.0 3.0
5.0 7.0
6.0 4.6
5.0 1.1
3
a B
3.0 5.0
4.0 5.0
7.5 5.4
5.0 2.0
2.6 5.0
4.0 6.0
7.3 6.7
3.0 1.3
2.5 6.6
4.0 6,0
7.0 6.3
7.0 1,2
2.0 5,5
4.0 6,0
8.3 5,6
3.3 1.2
2.0 4.8
5.0 8.0
8.0 5.3
6.0 2.1
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Table 3: Memory version Subjective ratings
Point
Route
Activity
Level
Complexity
Difficulty
Stress
Workload
Subject
A
B
C
D
A
B
C
D
A
B
C
D
A
B
C
D
A
B
C
D
1
a B
1.0 2.0
4.0 3.0
3.7 4.2
1.0 2.0
1.0 1.0
3.0 3.0
4.3 2.8
1.0 1.9
1.0 1.5
3.0 3.0
4.2 4.3
1.0 1.9
1.0 1.0
3.0 3.0
3.4 5.6
1.0 1.8
1.0 1.5
2.0 2.0
4.4 5.4
1.0 2.0
2
a B
4.0 3.0
7.0 4.0
4.5 3.4
2.0 2.0
5.0 1.5
7.0 4.0
5.0 3.3
1.0 2.1
5.0 2.0
7.0 4.0
4.8 3.8
2.0 2.1
5.0 1.5
7.0 3.0
4.1 4.8
1.0 2.0
4.0 2.0
8.0 3.0
4.8 5.6
2.0 3.0
3
a B
5.0 2.2
5.0 3.0
5.0 6.4
4.0 3.0
3.0 1.3
5.0 3.0
5.6 6.4
1.0 3.0
5.0 1.8
5.0 3.0
5.7 7.3
4.0 3.0
5.0 1.3
5.0 3.0
3.8 7.3
3.0 3.0
2.5 2.0
7.0 2.0
5.8 6.7
3.0 3.0
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Tables 4 and 5: Overall Subjective ratings
ACTIVITY SCENARIOS
Activity Level
Complexity
Difficulty
Stress
Workload
mean
a
4,9
4.1
5.0
4.5
5.0
B
4.3
4.1
4.3
4.1
4.4
a&B
4.6
4.1
4.6
4.3
4.7
standard deviation
a
1.4
1.7
1.5
1.8
1.6
B
1.6
2.1
2.1
2.1
2.3
a&B
1.5
1.9
1.9
1.9
2.0
MEMORY SCENARIOS
Activity Level
Complexity
Difficulty
Stress
Workload
mean
a 5 a&B
3.8 3.1 3.5
3.4 2.7 3.1
3.9 3.1 3.5
3.5 3.1 3.3
3.7 3.1 3.4
standard deviation
a B a&B
1.6 1.2 1.5
2.0 1.3 1.7
1.7 1.5 1.7
1.8 1.8 1.8
2.1 1.6 1.9
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segments 1, 2, or 3 at a 90 percent confidence level. This implied
that for these scenarios, the overall workload varied little from
phase to phase.
Mean Subjective Rating data is plotted in Figure 30 for all
five categories. Since there was little difference between the
alpha and beta routes, I have only plotted the overall mean ratings
for the activity and memory versions. The mean memory ratings are
shown as circles, and the mean activity ratings are shown as
triangles.
Student t-tests showed a statistically significant difference
between the two versions for the Complexity and Stress ratings at a
90 percent confidence level. The difference was significant at a
95 percent level for Activity Level, Difficulty, and Workload.
The lower confidence level for the Complexity rating may be due
to the fact that all runs were performed manually. That is, the
autopilot was not used. Thus, "complexity" changed little. The
lower confidence level for Stress may be due to the relatively low
workload level for these experiments. These experiments attempted
to simulate a normal air traffic environment. The relatively low
ratings are, therefore, consistent with Katz's [10] findings for a
similar environment.
As Figure 30 shows, the activity version ratings were
consistently higher (harder, more difficult) than the memory version
ratings. This was somewhat surprising since the average total
(activity plus mental) WU's were greater for the memory version than
the activity version. (218.5 WU's versus 187.0 WU's: 116.8 percent)
Since other results had lent credibility to the use of this
"workload unit" technique, several explanations are possible.
First, the 17 percent difference in WU's between the two versions
may not be significant at these low to moderate workload levels.
Second, because subjects were "busier", doing a greater number of
relatively simple tasks, they may have equated simple busyness with
greater workload. (This premise, however, would contradict Katz's
[12] results in a similar experiment.) Third, the nature of
physical and mental workload may be different enough to invalidate
comparing workload levels by simply adding the two types of WU's.
Fourth, the mental "workload unit" model may be faulty. There may
be relatively heavy mental workloads initially and at information
retrieval, with little or very low mental workload in between.
Tables 6 and 7 give the altitude error data for the activity
and memory versions. The table lists mean errors, the standard
deviation, and rms errors for each subject and both alpha and beta
routes. The data is also averaged across all the pilots and across
both routes. This information is shown for the overall mean and rms
altitude deviations in Figure 31.
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Tables 6 and 7: Altitude Error Data (feet)
ACTIVITY VERSION
a
B
mean
std dev
rms
mean
std dev
rms
Pilots
A B C D
59.0 77.3 95.7 69.4
36.1 71.4 124.7 59.3
69.1 105.1 157.2 91.3
60.6 95.0 59.1 99.0
53.3 57.6 60.6 105.8
80.7 111.0 84.7 144.9
avrg.
74.3
79.9
109.2
74.6
71.1
103.0
overall
74.4 mean
76.1 std dev
106.5 rms
MEMORY VERSION
a
B
mean
std dev
rms
mean
std dev
rms
Pilots
A B C D
81.7 163.0 72.4 121.6
49.7 134.8 57.4 94.3
95.6 211.5 92.4 153.9
93.2 122.3 74.3 53.4
70.8 80.6 61.6 45.6
117.0 146.4 96.5 70.2
avrg.
103.0
90.3
137.0
84.1
69.4
109.1
overall
93.5 mean
81.0 std dev
123.8 rms
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Student t-test analysis of these errors gives the following
results: (1) mean absolute altitude errors were different for the
activity and memory versions at an 80 percent confidence level; (2)
rms altitude errors were different at a 70 percent confidence level.
The relative weakness in distinguishing these two versions with
objective data may be due to the fact that there was no "baseline"
version for comparison. Both versions were designed to be
difficult, but difficult in different ways. Furthermore, both
versions were rated only moderately difficult. Experiments at a
higher level of difficulty may increase the sensitivity of this
measure.
As Figure 31 illustrates, both types of altitude errors were
greater for the memory versions than the activity versions. This is
surprising since the activity version had a far more demanding
altitude profile.
The greater altitude errors for the memory version are probably
not due to pilot boredom. No individual run lasted more than 30
minutes, and runs were broken by several "freezes" for subjective
ratings. Also, the pilots knew that their performance was being
measured, increasing interest. Finally, the memory version had few
"quiet" periods longer than several minutes.
Two other, more promising, explanations relate to interest or
attention. In the activity version, subjects were repeatedly asked
to change airspeed, altitude, and heading. Thus, they probably
channelled more effort and attention to these tasks, resulting in
smaller deviations. This would also help explain the slightly
higher subjective ratings for this version.
Alternatively, another type of prioritizing may have occurred.
Given a lower task workload in the memory version, the subjects may
have shifted aircraft control to a lower priority. This would
produce a certain level of complacency about altitude, while
subjects paid additional attention to memory items.
Table 8 provides data on long-term memory errors for all four
scenarios. However, this chart further differentiates among
long-term memory tasks: Positional tasks and Non-Positional tasks.
A "Positional" task pertains to something requiring changing the
aircraft's state: for example, "Descend and maintain 3000 at Point
Delta". An example of a "Non-Positional" task is, "Report at Point
Delta".
Although it is difficult to generalize because of the small
total number of tasks, the percentage of forgotten "Positional"
tasks was similar for all four scenarios and the percentage of
forgotten "Non-Positional" tasks was also similar for all four
scenarios. However, on average, only 12.5 percent of "Positional"
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tasks were missed, while 40.6 percent of "Non-Positional" tasks were
missed.
Table 8: Long-term Memory Errors:
Positional and Non-Positional
Scenario
Positional Tasks
Number of Errors
Error Percentage
Non-Positional Tasks
Number of Errors
Error Percentage
Activity a
0
0
0
4
2
50.0
Activity B
0
0
0
4
2
50.0
Memory a
8
1
12.5
12
5
41.7
Memory B
8
1
12.5
12
4
33.3
Thus, it appears that the pilots were deliberately prioritizing
memory items by type. Requirements relating to aircraft state
received higher priority than ARTCC requests, for example. These
results are consistent with a study by Loftus, Dark, and Vdlliams
[15], They found that "place" information was well remembered while
"frequency" information was remembered relatively poorly.
3.6 MAIN FINDINGS FROM PRELIMINARY EXPERIMENT
1. The Workload Unit (WU) technique appears to work
satisfactorily for quantifying similar types of workload. It works
less well for comparing dissimilar (i.e. mental and physical)
workloads.
2. At low to moderate workload levels, pilots reported a higher
workload when given physical tasks than when given memory tasks.
3. At a low to moderate workload level, pilots reported higher
subjective workload ratings for scenarios where altitude deviations
decreased, possibly due to greater attention or interest.
4. Greater memory workload appears to interfere with activity
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performance.
5. At low to moderate workloads, subjective ratings were more
sensitive to scenario differences than objective, primary-task
measures. (This result is similar to that reported by Williges and
Wierwille. [31])
6. Pilots systematically weighted aircraft state requirements
higher than other requirements.
3.7 FOLLOW-ON EXPERIMENT IDEAS
These findings led to a number of conclusions and ideas
relating to the next series of experiments. The new experiments
would attempt to clarify and expand on the preceding findings.
The Workload Unit technique for quantifying workload had
demonstrated its validity in certain limited applications. Thus, it
would be used again.
A "Baseline" scenario would be added to provide a nominal
scenario for comparison. It would be a low workload scenario,
representative of routine terminal approach activity at a
non-congested airfield.
The non-nominal scenarios would be designed to be much more
difficult than the scenarios for these first experiments. Workload
ratings on a 10 point scale exceeded 5 only 38 percent of the time,
6 only 20 percent of the time, and 7 only 7 percent of the time. A
rating of 8 was exceeded only once in 120 ratings, and 9 never.
Thus, there seemed to be a good deal of workload capacity remaining
in the pilot volunteers.
It was decided that greatly increasing the workload level might
increase the ability of objective measures to distinguish between a
high physical tasking scenario and a high mental tasking scenario.
It could also shed additional light on the multi-dimensional
character of mental workload by producing significant differences
among the various subjective ratings.
The differences in pilot performance for remembering
"positional" versus "non-positional" memory tasks was striking. The
next series of experiments could further examine this issue by
increasing the mental workload and expanding the number of memory
tasks.
Although some of these pilots were "fighter-types" and some
were "heavy-types", all had a great deal of high-performance jet
aircraft experience. The next series of experiments would expand
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the experience base as much as possible. This could broaden the
range of subjective workloads and produce more examples of
"saturated" pilots.
Finally, the next series of experiments might examine the time
sensitivity of mental tasks. That is, how much more likely are
pilots to forget tasks far in the future than tasks which are closer
at hand?
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Chapter 4
PRIMARY EXPERIMENT: DESIGN
4.1 SUBJECTS
The results of the first set of experiments led me to recruit
pilots with a wide range of experience. Katz [12] and others had
found that pilots with lower levels of experience tended to rate
workload higher than did more experienced pilots. So, I hoped that
the less experienced pilots might be more easily "saturated",
providing important data on how mental workload affected performance
under these extreme conditions. Nevertheless, due to the nature of
this series of experiments, even the less experienced pilots needed
to be very proficient in instrument flying procedures.
Initially, approximately 30 pilots volunteered to participate.
They were brought in to fly the simulator for at least oue and
sometimes two, 2-hour evaluation sessions. Although I had hoped to
use at least a dozen pilots of varied background, the list of 3U was
soon reduced to 10. Few of the original 30 had logged any high
performance aircraft time, and the simulation's higher airspeeds and
unfamiliar instrumentation disqualified most of these pilots.
Three of my ten finalists were eventually forced to withdraw
from the experiment before finishing it. A lack of time and other
commitments made it impossible for them to devote the number of
hours or days necessary to practice, qualify on the simulator, and
take part in all the data runs.
I ended up with seven pilots. All were good pilots, and there
was a good mix of experience. Three were Air Force pilots with a
great deal of flight time. Two pilots were Certified Flight
Instructors with instrument ratings. The four civilian pilots
ranged in experience from 300 total hours to 3000 total hours and
had between 50 and 250 hours of instrument time.
The following is a breakdown of their experience:
A: Light Aircraft: 300 Hours
Total: 3UO
B: Light Aircraft: 320
Total: 320
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C: Light Aircraft: 1300 Hours
Total: 1300
D: Sailplane: 1000
Light Aircraft: 2000
Total: 3000
E: Fighter-Type: 3200
Jet: '2750
Total: 3200
F: Light Aircraft: 500
Fighter-Type: 12UO
Heavy Aircraft: 700
Jet: 1900
Total: 2400
G: Light Aircraft: 250
Fighter-Type: 500
Heavy Aircraft: 1750
Jet: 2250
Total: 2500
4.2 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
Only one route was used for this series of experiments.
However, there were four scenarios once again. The four scenarios
differed enough that it was felt only one route was necessary.
Figure 32 illustrates the basic route.
The four scenarios were labeled Baseline, Activity, Planning,
and Combined. The Baseline scenario was the easiest. It simulated
a "normal" flight and the pilots were encouraged to use the
autopilot to keep workload at a minimum. There were no directed
deviations from the basic course, and airspeed and altitude changes
were rare. Also, there were very few memory or planning tasks
assigned.
A data session consisted of a Baseline run followed by one of
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Figure 32: Navigation Chart, for the Primary Experiment
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the other scenarios. The Baseline scenario was used as a warm-up
data run and as a calibration run. Each second run's data was
compared to that session's Baseline run. Baseline performance and
ratings for different sessions could theii be compared to adjust the
data for variations due to day-to-day differences such as fatigue,
stress, emotional state, et cetera.
The Activity scenario was very similar to the Activity scenario
of the preliminary experiment. It was loaded with a variety of
manual-control tasks, but contained a planning task load similar to
the Baseline scenario. The pilots flew this scenario without using
the autopilot. It did differ significantly from the activity
scenario"of the preliminary experiments in that its activity
workload (as measured in WU's per minute) was 40 percent greater
while its memory workload was 50 per cent lower.
The Planning scenario was very different from the Activity
scenario. It was almost identical in manual activity to the
Baseline scenario, (and thus, had a low activity level) but instead
of being directed to perform actions immediately, the pilots were
directed to perform these actions at a certain time in the future.
These instructions often involved overlapping time periods, and the
requests were not ordered chronologically. Therefore, the pilots
had to sort out the instructions and "plan".
For example, prior to 2:00 minutes the pilot might be told to
descend 1000 feet at 5:00 minutes, then told to turn to 300 degrees
heading at 13:30 minutes, then to slow to 190 knots at 8:00 minutes.
In terms of memory WU's, the Planning scenario was 80 percent
more difficult than the Memory scenario of the preliminary
experiments. Conversely, its activity HU rate was only one-third
that of the preliminary runs. This scenario was flown on autopilot
to keep the manual-control workload low.
The Combined scenario was designed to be the most difficult of
all. It combined the manual activity of the Activity scenario with
the planning requirements of the Planning scenario. This was an
effort to saturate the pilots and see if any performance measure
deteriorated sharply. The pilots were allowed to use the autopilot
for help, but the pace of this scenario usually limited its use to
making turns and holding headings.
Table 9 lists the order in which each pilot flew each of the
non-Baseline scenarios. Different pilots flew the various scenarios
in different orders. However, as mentioned earlier, they all begaii
each session's data runs with a Baseline run. The other three
scenarios were not truly order randomized, but they were tuixed. No
pilot flew the Combined scenario in the first session. It was so
unusually difficult, it was felt that starting with this scenario
might create an impossible workload for any pilot flying it first.
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Therefore, all subjects flew either the Activity or Planning
scenario in their first session. Then, the Combined scenario might
be flown in either the second or third session.
Table 9: Session number in which pilots flew each scenario
SCENARIO
Activity
Planning
Combined
PILOT
A
. 1
2
3
B
2
1
3
C
3
1
2
D
3
1
2
E
1
3
2
F
2
1
3
G
1
2
3
A Navigation Chart (Figure 32) and a note pad were provided for
each pilot's use. Also, special placards were displayed beneath the
instrument display to give configuration/airspeed data and help the
pilots with the various lateral and longitudinal autopilot modes.
Ground tracks, altitude profiles, and airspeed profiles
provided in Figures 33 through 37, clearly illustrate some ot the
differences and similarities of the various scenarios. Those three
items were nearly identical for the Baseline and Planning scenarios,
and for the Activity and Combined scenarios. Figure 33 shows the
ground track for the Baseline and Planning scenarios while Figure 34
shows the ground track for the Activity and Combined scenarios.
Note the number of heading changes for the Activity/Combined
scenarios. In the Activity and Combined scenarios the subjects were
given new headings, altitudes, and airspeeds each 2 minutes for the
first 5 minutes, each minute for the next 10 minutes, and each 30
seconds for the final 10 minutes. .At several points, pilots were
given instructions to contact ARTCC rather than perform some task.
Figure 35 is an airspeed versus time plot for the Planning and
Activity scenarios. There are 31 airspeed changes for the Activity
and Combined scenarios and 3 for the Baseline and Planning scenarios.
Figure 36 plots aircraft heading versus time. The Activity ana
Combined scenarios have 27 heading changes to 5 for the Baseline ana
Planning scenarios.
Finally, Figure 37 shows altitude versus time. The Activity
and Combined scenarios have 21 directed altitude changes to 5 for
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Figure 34: Nominal ground track for the Activity and Combined scenarios
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the Baseline and Planning scenarios.
Just as in the first set of experiments, workload units (WU's)
were computed for the manual and mental tasks of the four
scenarios. The procedure for calculating these relative workloads
was the same as before. For a full description of the technique,
see section 3.2.
Figures 38 and 39 are examples of the planning task and
workload unit plots for each scenario. Figure 38 is for the
Activity scenario and Figure 39 is for the Planning scenario. Each
figure presents a variety of activities plotted against elapsed
time. At the top, each square block represents carrying out one
assigned planning task. Next is a plot of planning WU's. This is
followed by a diagram showing the number and duration of short-term,
medium-term, and long-term planning tasks. The bottom plot shows
activity WU's.
I arbitrarily defined a short-term planning task as lasting
from 0 to 4 minutes, a medium-term task lasting from 4 to 12
minutes, and a long-term task lasting over 12 minutes. The average
short-term task was 2.6 minutes long, the average medium task was
7.2 minutes, and the average long-term task was 16.6 minutes.
Table 10 summarizes the information for all four scenarios.
Note that the Planning and Combined scenarios have about 5 times as
many planning WU's as the Baseline and Activity scenarios. Also,
the Activity and Combined scenarios have roughly 5 times as many
activity WU's as the Baseline and Planning scenarios. Finally, the
Planning and Combined scenarios have almost 6 times as many planning
tasks as the Baseline and Activity scenarios.
In recognition of Miller's 117] findings about human limits on
immediate memory, the number of simultaneous planning tasks never
exceeded 9. The Planning and Combined scenarios had an intense
level of simultaneous planning tasks. However, the mean number of
simultaneous planning tasks was only 5.0, with a standard deviation
of 1.8.
Figures 40 and 41 portray some of this workload data
graphically. Figure 40 is a plot of the accumulated number of
activity WU's as a function of time. Figure 41 is a plot of the
accumulated number of planning WU's as a function of time. Note not
only the difference between dissimilar scenarios, but also the
similar workload rate for similar scenarios.
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150T
Activity
Units
100--
50 -
Baseline
Activity — — — —
Planning • —• —
Combined
10 15 20
Elapsed Time (minutes)
25
Figure 40: Accumulated Activity Workload Units versus elapsed time
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250-
Mental
Units
200--
150--
100-•
50--
Baseline
Activity
Planning
Combined
10 15
Elapsed Time (minutes)
20 25
Figure 41: Accumulated Mental Workload Units versus elapsed time
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Table 10: Scenario characteristics
Total Planning WU's
Total Number of
Planning Tasks
Short-term Planning
Tasks
Medium-term
Planning Tasks
Long-term
Planning Tasks
Total Activity WU's
Scenario
 ;
Baseline
43
3
0
3
0
28
Activity
47
3
0
3
0
150
Planning
253
23
14
6
3
29
Combined
254
24
16
5
3
142
4.3 TRAINING AND INSTRUCTIONS
In addition to the initial screening sessions, each pilot
participated in 4 to 10 hours of additional training. Three of the
four pilots had flown the simulator before, but had never used the
.autopilot. They required about 4 hours of additional practice.
This autopilot is different from most commercial equipment.
Longitudinal and Lateral modes must be engaged separately, adding
one additional step to selecting some autopilot functions. (See
Appendix 2 for a full description of the autopilot and autopilot
dynamics.)
Those subjects who hadn't previously flown the simulator neeaed
familiarization with several additional things. First, there was
the flight instrument display. Two of the civilian pilots had only
limited experience with an ADI/HSI presentation. The other two
civilian pilots had no ADI/HSI background. Second, since all of the
many switches and controls were mounted on the relatively small
Control Box, it took a good deal of practice to become familiar with
the switches, their functions, and their relative placement. Third,
the dynamics and flight control sensitivity of a high-performance
aircraft were new to the civilian pilots. Fourth, the control-stick
or joy-stick was a completely new device for two o± the civilian
pilots. They had to become familiar with the problem of
inadvertently coupling lateral and longitudinal inputs. Finally,
the four pilots who hadn't flown the simulator before had to get
used to the "feel" of the control-stick. The Control Box had rather
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small springs for returning the control stick to a near neutral
position. Thus, the pilot does not feel the magnitude of force
feedback he is used to in most aircraft.
Before a session's data runs, pilots "warmed up" by flying
instrument approaches, turns to headings, etc., for 20 to 30
minutes. After this warm up period, the pilots were handed the
Instruction Sheet reproduced in Figure 42, the Subjective
Ratings/Comments Sheet shown in Figure 43, and a Workload Reference
Sheet (Figure 29).
In the instructions, pilots were told to fly "as well as you
can" and follow all directions "to the best of your ability". They
were also told that they would be scored on their ability to "follow
instructions and comply with requests". Thus, they had no idea
which parameter(s) would be measured. Any or all might be scored.
There was a distinct danger that the less experienced pilots
would feel they were being compared directly with the more
experienced pilots, and therefore feel additional stress. To combat
this, all pilots were verbally -assured that the primary focus of the
experiment was the variations in their performance.
The Subjective Rating Sheet (Figure 43) was similar to, but
different from, that used in the preliminary experiments. The
greatest difference was in the number of divisions per scale. The
preliminary experiment rating sheet had 10 divisions per scale.
This new sheet had only two.
When using the rating sheet of Figure 2b, the pilots often
placed their ratings neatly between divisions or directly at the
divisions. They did this despite instructions to consider the scale
as being continuous. Therefore, to eliminate or reduce this
"digitizing" effect, the only internal division in the new sheet's
scales was at the half-way point. In theory, this provided one
additional anchor while giving the subconscious a greater role in
placing the ratings at an appropriate point.
In addition, scale descriptors on the new Rating Sheet were
changed from "low" and "high" to something more appropriate to the
individual scale. The Instruction Sheet also gave a short
description of what was intended by each of the five measures.
As explained in the instructions, the simulation was "frozen"
for subjective ratings at 5:00, 16:00, and 27:00 minutes elapsed
time. The instructions explained the desired scoring style and
noted that one minute was allowed for making the ratings during each
break. The preliminary experiment had shown that the pilots only
required about 20 to 30 seconds for making their ratings.
After each run, the pilots were debriefed and asked to put any
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Instructions
This experiment investigates pilot workload. It is funded by NASA's
Ames Research Center and the results will be incorporated in a
forthcoming report.
Each session will consist of two flights. Each flight follows
a similar ground track to an ILS approach to Runway 36, as is
shown on the Navigational Chart.
Your task is to fly as well as you can, following all directions
and requests to the best of your ability. You will be scored on
your ability to follow instructions and comply with requests. Some
requests/directions will be related to a geographic point, such as
VOR #1. Most will be linked to a specific indicated elapsed time.
This indicated elapsed time is displayed on the instrument panel
directly above the CWS display and below the airspeed display.
Please note that when you are not being vectored, you are expected
to lead your turns when leaving one course and intercepting another.
there will be a number of memory or planning tasks such as "Climb
to 3000 at 20:00". The 20:00 refers to the Indicated elapsed time.
There may be many such tasks, or only a few. There may be an overlap
in the tasks. To help'you plan, remember, and execute these tasks,
it is suggested that you write down these requests.
At 05:00, 16:00, and 2?:00 indicated elapsed time, the simulator
will be "frozen" and you will make five subjective interpretations
about how hard you are working or difficult the task is. The
categories are:
Activity-Level: How busy are you? Are you bored or nearly as
active as you can be?
Complexity: How complicated is the scenario, the required actions,
or the planning required?
Difficultyi How tough is your task?
Stress: Do you feel pressured?
Workloads See the accompanying sheet for explanations.
As shown in the example below, please make your first rating
with a 1, your second with a 2, and your third with a 3- You
will have one minute during each break to make all 5 ratings.
After the flight is over, you will have an opportunity for comments
and explanations. Please feel free to ask any questions you Bay
have.
Thank you for your tiae and effort.
Figure 42: Primary Experiment Pilot Instructions
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Activity-Level
bored
Complexity
simple
Difficulty
easy
Stress
none
Workload
light
ORIGINAL
OF POOR "QUALITY
continuous activity
complicated
,
: v e r y hard
high
very heavy
Activity-Level
bored
Complexity
simple
Difficulty
easy
Stress
none
Workload
light
continuous activity
complicated
very hard
high
very heavy
Figure 43: Subject ive Racings/Comments Sheet for Primary Experiment
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comments or explanations on the rear of the Rating Sheet.
4.4 DATA
For this set of experiments, the computer was reprogramiaed. It
no longer recorded Control Box manipulations, but now recorded
airspeed every 10 seconds in addition to the aircraft's x, y, and z
position. As described in section 3.4, this data yielded a ground
track, and by comparing position and elapsed time, desired altitudes
and airspeeds were determined. This information was then compared
with the actual airspeeds and altitudes to derive altitude and
airspeed error. Altitude errors were not computed during directed
climbs and descents and airspeed errors were not computed during
directed airspeed changes. Pilots were expected to climb or descend
at a minimum of 1000 feet per minute and accelerate or decelerate to
the desired airspeed within 30 seconds or at a rate of at least 50
knots per minute for airspeed changes greater than 2b knots. These
rates of change are consisted with recommended piloting techniques.
As explained in section 3.4, ground tracks were plotted for
reference but deviations from the nominal ground track were not
scored.
Altitude deviations still seemed to be the "best" objective
measure. However, with only one objective measure, it was possible
that pilots might give higher priority to one aspect of aircraft
control than another. If altitude control-improved, was airspeed
control deteriorating? If altitude control deteriorated, was
airspeed control improving? Measuring only one variable would miss
this trade-off. Thus, airspeed deviations were scored to serve as a
check of this possibility. Both variables were scored using mean
absolute and RMS deviations.
Just as in the preliminary experiments, Subjective ratings were
made for Activity Level, Complexity, Difficulty, Stress, and
Workload. Ratings were made at three points during each run.
However, this time the subjects were not asked to make an overall
rating after each run. This was because the "overall" ratings made
during the preliminary experiments were nearly identical to the
arithmetic mean of the three segment ratings.
The distance from the left edge of each scale to each pilot
rating was measured, divided by the total scale length, ana
multiplied by ten. This resulted in subjective ratings with a
possible range of 0 to 10, just as for the preliminary experiment.
Again, five experimentally proven subjective ratings were used
in order to examine the multi-dimensionality of the mental workload.
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An integral aspect of this set of experiments was an
investigation into not only the degree of mental workload, but also
the effect this effort had on observable pilot behavior. Thus, in
addition to the aircraft control measures and subjective ratings
just discussed, other aspects of pilot behavior were also measured.
As explained in section 4.2, each scenario had a certain number
of planning or memory tasks. During each run, notes were made on
each pilot's compliance in carrying out these assigned tasks. This
gave information on short-term, medium-term, and long-term tasks as
well as "positional" versus "non-positional" memory tasks. (See
Section 3.5) All pilots were assigned specific elapsed times
(clearly displayed on the instrument panel) at which to perform
these tasks. Each pilot was given + 15 seconds from the designated
time in which to begin the task. If a task was accomplished outside
these limits, it was noted.
When a task was performed improperly, for example climbing to a
wrong altitude or accelerating 10 knots instead of climbing 1000
feet, this was also noted.
A third type of mental error was forgetting or missing an item
entirely.
A final source of information was post run debriefings. The
pilots had many interesting and useful insights into mental
workload, stress, and the ways these affected performance.
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Chapter 5
PRIMARY EXPERIMENT: RESULTS
5.1 TRAINING AND LEARNING EFFECTS
Section 4.2 explained in detail how the experiment was designed
to minimize "learning effect". First, the pilots- flew the scenarios
in different orders so that the runs were roughly counterbalanced.
However, the counterbalancing was compromised to minimize the
probability of some pilots being hopelessly overwhelmed. Thus, the
Combined scenario was never flown first. This was the only
concession to counterbalancing.
Second, as mentioned briefly in Chapter 4, each session's
Baseline run acted as a "warm up" run and served as a day-to-day
metric for the Subjective ratings. For each Subjective rating, the
Baseline run ratings were averaged across all seven pilots and all
three runs for each pilot. This yielded an overall mean baseline
rating. This mean rating was added to the difference of a session's
Baseline rating and second run (Activity, Planning, or Combined)
rating. This gave an "adjusted" second run rating. The intent was
to compensate for day-to-day differences in emotional state, stress,
fatigue, et cetera.
Third, each subject was a highly trained pilot, went through a
rigorous screening process, and was then trained on the simulator
for an additional 5 to 15 hours. At the end of this training
period, the pilots appeared to have passed the "knee" of the
performance curve.
Katz [10] conducted a similar experiment and had considerable
difficulty. He warned that a major problem was encountering a
marked learning curve "...despite concerted efforts to circumvent
learning curve effects by establishing a rather long briefing/warmup
flight period."
He found that, "Performance stabilization and verbal question-
naires are inadequate indicators of learning curve plateaus." In
the case of mental workload, these traditional indicators are not
sufficient. Because of the "accumulator effect", subjects may show
excellent performance but assess lower and lower workload ratings.
Referring to Figure 4, as subjects' experience and expertise
increase, they can maintain constant performance even though their
subjective workload decreases.
So, the Objective and Subjective data was examined for
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"learning effects". Using Student t-test and F-test techniques, I
found a learning effect at a 90 percent confidence level for
altitude deviations in the Baseline scenario. However, there was no
significant learning effect in the altitude deviations for the
Activity, Planning, or Combined scenarios.. The Baseline altitude
deviations were small, and did not enter into further results
analysis.
There was no sign of learning effect in the airspeed deviation
data for any of the four scenarios.
An examination of the Subjective Rating data yielded mixed
results. Using the adjusted ratings, there was no "learning effect"
for any of the ratings for the Activity scenarios. For the Planning
scenario, only the Workload ratings showed a weak (80 percent
confidence level) learning effect.
The extensive training, the modified counterbalancing of
scenarios and subjects, and "adjusting" the subjective ratings
appears to have minimized learning effect for the Activity and
Planning scenarios.
However, there was some evidence of learning effect for the
Combined scenario. Three subjective ratings were lower for the
third sessions than the second sessions. The effect was at an BO
percent confidence level for Complexity ratings. Since post-run
debriefings showed that Complexity ratings were closely tied to the
pilots' ease with the autopilot, this may be due to greater
familiarity with the device. Learning effect was at a much stronger
95 percent confidence level for the Difficulty and Workload
ratings. This is understandable. None of the practice rounds were
nearly as intense as the Combined scenario.. Furthermore, the
Combined scenario was the sum of the Activity and Planning
scenarios. Subjects who had seen both the Activity and Planning
scenarios before flying the Combined scenario had an advantage over
those who flew the Combined scenario after flying only one of the
others. i
Finally, an analysis of variance showed no statistically
significant difference for planning task performance for any
scenario.
5.2 ALTITUDE AND AIRSPEED DEVIATION RESULTS
Altitude error data was synthesized from the computer's output
and is shown in Table 11. Both mean absolute error and rms error
data is listed for each pilot, scenario, and segment. This data, in
turn, is consolidated into overall error data for scenarios and
segments in Table 12.
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Table 11: Individual mean absolute and rms
altitude deviations (feet)
SCENARIO
Baseline
Segment I: mean
rms
Segment II:
Segment III:
Overall:
Activity
Segment I: mean
rms
Segment II:
Segment III:
Overall:
Planning
Segment I: mean
rms
Segment II :
,
Segment III:
, Overall :
Pilot
A
34.9
41.6
42.5
49.5
26.1
29.3
34.5
40.1
71.6
78.7
111.8
165.7
106.0
172.0
96.5
138.8
"
5.8
9.3
57.0
66.7
4 4 . 4
62.0
35.7
46.0
B
33.
37.
38.
43.
26.
28.
32.
36.
46.
49.
93.
141.
143.
201.
94.
130.
71.
93.
55.
72.
61.
66.
62.
77.
9
8
5
4
1
8
8
7
3
0
8
4
6
0
6
5
2
4
5
8
6
8
8
7
C
45
54
87
93
58
67
63
72
342
420
128
205
163
233
211
286
11
12
59
60
110
110
60
61
.4
.7
.5
.4
.0
.9
.6
.0
.1
.2
.3
.2
.2
.1
.2
.2
.9
.7
.8
.3
.6
.6
.8
.2
D
7b.9
85.3
48.8
53.9
25.4
27.0
50.4
55.4
172.0
273.4
101.1
140.1
147.8
253.3
140.3
222.3
14.0
15.1
67.7
80.6
91.6
95.4
57.8
63.7
E
29
30
29
36
33
56
30
40
84
110
86
111
111
128
94
116
7
7
41
53
27
28
25
29
.4
.4
.6
.0
.2
.2
.7
.9
.8
.5
.8
.0
.9
.0
.5
.5
.0
.2
.9
.7
.2
.9
.4
.9
F
31.
44.
26.
35.
22.
30.
26.
36.
52.
67.
111.
242.
198.
272.
121.
194.
13.
14.
43.
48.
27.
29.
28.
30.
1
3
6
3
8
6
8
7
9
6
5
6
8
6
1
2
7
0
2
0
2
0
0
3
G
18.2
20.1
11.0
14.6
14.5
16.3
14.6
17.0
31.2
35.4
50.7
67.6
94.5
133.2
58.8
78.7
12. 9
13.1
9.7
13.8
26.4
30.1
16.3
19.0
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Table 11, continued
SCENARIO
Combined
Segment I: mean
rms
Segment II:
Segment III :
Overall:
Pilot
A
109.
139.
191.
292.
313.
405.
204.
279.
3
6
9
7
0
4
7
2
B
23.1
33.0
58.0
117.8
72.2
107.8
51.1
86.2
C
17 b
231
249
424
195
269
207
308
.7
.3
.6
.0
.0
.5
.1
.3
D
230.4
375.4
157.1
220.9
167.9
210.4
185.1
268.9
E
89
115
53
97
137
176
93
129
.4
.5
.9
.8
.5
.3
.6
.?
F
8.
9.
83.
145.
101.
136.
64.
97.
3
2
4
8
6
5
4
2
G
17.1
18.0
63.2
88.7
96.3
128.6
58.9
78.4
Table 12: Overall mean absolute and rms
altitude deviations (feet)
SCENARIO
Baseline
Activity
Planning
Combined
SEGMENT
I
II
III
Overall
I
II
III
Overall
I
II
III
Overall
I
II
III
Overall
MEAN
39.1
41.4
30.6
37.0
114.4
97.7
138.0
116.7
19.5
47.8
55.6
41.0
93.5
122.4
154.8
123.6
STD DEV
18.7
24.0
13.8
19.0
110.5
24.8
36.6
67.3
23.0
19.1
34.0
29.5
85.6
77.5
81.8
81.7
RMS
50.6
51.0
41.4
4 7. -7
147.8
153.3
199.0
166.7
23.5
56.6
60.4
46.8
131.7
198.2
204.9
178.3
94
Note the standard deviation data in Table 12. Comparing these
standard deviations with the individual pilot performance data trom
Table 11, one can see that the bulk of pilot deviations tended to
lie near the mean. However, there was usually some pilot whose
deviations took an extreme, isolated jump, inflating the standard
deviation for the group.
In general, just as the WU rate increased from Segment 1 to
Segment III, so did altitude deviations, (see Figure 44) The
exaggerated effect of large deviations in the rms data concealed any
statistically significant segment-to-segment differences for the
Baseline or Activity scenarios, but the mean absolute error data
yielded significant differences for all four scenarios. Using
F-tests, segment-to-segment mean error differences were significant
at a 90 percent confidence level for the Combined scenario, 95
percent for the Baseline and Activity scenarios, and 99 percent for
the Planning scenario. The larger spread of individual performance
in the Combined scenario was responsible for its lower confidence
level result.
Differences and similarities among the scenarios were
striking. First of all, the magnitude of altitude deviations was a
strong function of the mode of aircraft control. As figure 44
shows, there was a considerable difference between the manually
controlled Combined and Activity scenarios and the autopilot
controlled Planning and Baseline scenarios. Using a t-test, the
difference was significant with 99 percent confidence. The average
deviation was 3.1 times greater (120.2 feet versus 39.0 feet) under
manual control, and the rms deviation was 3.6 times greater (17^ .5
feet versus 47.3 feet). However, all the difference cannot be
ascribed simply to manual control versus autopilot control
differences. The manually controlled Combined and Activity
scenarios also had much more difficult altitude profiles than the
autopilot controlled scenarios. (See Figure 37)
Interestingly, the magnitude of mental tasking had. no
significant impact on the-magnitude of the altitude deviations. The
Baseline scenario's altitude deviations were statistically similar
to those of the Planning scenario which differed from it solely in
having a large number of mental planning tasks. Similarly, the
Activity and mentally demanding Combined scenario results were
statistically identical.
Airspeed error data was also synthesized from the computer's
output, and is presented in Tables 13 and 14. Like the altitude
deviation data, some of the large standard deviations in Table 14
are due to some pilot's momentary lapse. Most of the deviation data
was fairly consistent in magnitude.
Unlike the altitude deviation data, segment-to-segment
differences in both mean absolute and rms airspeed errors -were
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Table 13: Individual mean absolute and rms
airspeed deviations (knots)
SCENARIO
Baseline
Segment I: mean
rms
Segment II:
Segment III:
Overall:
Activity
Segment I: mean
rms
Segment II :
Segment III:
Overall :
Planning
Segment I: mean
rms
Segment II:
Segment III:
Overall:
Pilot
A
3.1
3.5
4.0
4.1
3.0
3.3
3.4
3.6
7.8
8.5
17.4
22.4
22.4
30.9
15.9
20.6
0.2
0.3
7.5
7.5
1.9
2.5
3.2
3.4
fi
1.7
2.6
3.5
5.5
2.5
2.9
2.6
3.7
4.9
5.5
10.0
13.4
18.0
22.2
11.0
13.7
;-
1.3
2.4
3.7
4.2
3.2
4.2
2.7
3.6
C
1.7
2.0
3.5
4.2
3.6
4.3
2.9
3.5
7.7
8.8
11.7
14.3
8.8
10.3
9.4
11.1
1.2
2.1
4.1
4.2
7.3
7.3
4 .2
4.5
D
1.7
2.6
4.0
4.4
3.9
4.7
3.2
3.9
5.9
7.4
8.3
12.9
8.9
11.4
7.7
10.6
0.2
0.3
2 .4
3.0
1.9
2.1
1.5
1.8
E
2.8
3.2
5.0
5.6
7.1
8.9
5.0
5.9
22.1
25.3
9.6
12.6
10.7
13.3
14.1
17.1
0.8
0.8
0.8
0.9
1.7
2.0
1.1
1.2
F
1.1
1.4
2.9
3.7
2 .2
2.4
2.1
2.5
3.6
4.7
3.9 .
4.9
7.2
10.4
4.9
6.7
0.7
0 .7
1.5
1.7
3.4
5.3
1.9
2.6
G
1.3
2.0
4.5
4.8
1.3
1.7
2.4
2.8
2.9
3.9
5.9
7.1
7.4
10.1
5.4
7.1
0.6
0.6
b.l
6.3
3.6
3.8
3.4
3.5
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Table 13, continued
SCENARIO
Combined
Segment I: mean
rms
Segment II:
Segment III:
Overall:
Pilot
A
6.7
8.1
15.3
18.9
8.0
10.7
10.0
12.6
B
4.6
4.9
9.9
13.3
9.0
11.1
7.8
9.8
9
10
17
22
9
12
12
15
C
.3
.6
.4
.8
.7
.4
.1
.3
6
8
10
14
11
17
9
13
D
.0
.2
.4
.7
.4
.2
.3
.4
3
4
12
16
17
25
11
15
E
.3
.1
.6
.8
.9
.3
.3
.4
2
3
6
7
5
8
4
6
F
.3
.1
.2
.3
.8
.7
.8
.4
G
4.1
4.3
5.1
6.1
5.4
7.1
4.9
5.8
Table 14: Overall mean absolute and rms
airspeed deviations (knots)
SCENARIO
Baseline
Activity
Planning
Combined
SEGMENT
I
II
III
Overall
I
II
III
Overall
I
II
III
Overall
I
II
III
Overall
MEAN
1.9
3.9
3.4
3.1
7.9
9.5
11.9
9.8
0.7
3.7
3.3
2.6
5.2
11.0
9.6
8.6
STD DEV
0.7
0.7
1.9
1.4
6.6
4.3
5.9
5.7
0.4
2.4
1.9
2.2
2.4
4.5
4.2
4.4
RMS
2.9
5.0
4.4
4.1
9.2
12.5
15.5
12.4
1.0
4.0
3.9
3.0
6.2
14.3
13.2
11.2
98
significant for all four scenarios (See Figure 45). For mean
absolute airspeed errors, the segments differed at a 90 percent
confidence level for the Activity scenario and a 99 percent level
for the Baseline, Planning, and Combined scenarios. RMS airspeed
errors differed at a 95 percent confidence level for the Baseline
and Activity scenarios and a 99 percent confidence level for the
Planning and Combined scenarios.
Like the altitude deviation data, the magnitude of airspeed
errors was a strong function of the mode of aircraft control. As
shown in Figure 45, when airspeed was under manual control,
deviations were much greater than when airspeed was under autopilot
control. The difference was statistically significant at a 99
percent confidence level for mean absolute error and a 98 percent
level for rms errors. Mean absolute airspeed deviations were 3.3
times as large (9.2 knots to 2.8 knots) and rms deviations were 3.4
times as large (11.8 knots to 3.5 knots) when the simulator was
flown manually rather than with the autopilot. Part of this result
may be due to the much more difficult airspeed profile for the
manually controlled scenarios (See Figure 35).
This airspeed deviation data also showed little mental tasking
effect. There was no significant difference between scenarios which
had similar manual activity levels but different planning workloads.
Both altitude and airspeed deviations were similar for all the
pilots. In general, the low experience pilots had slightly higher
deviations than the most experienced pilots. However, there was
enough scatter in the data to keep the differences statistically
insignificant.
This objective data showed only a hint of performance
degradation due.to pilot workload saturation. During the Activity
scenario runs, only two pilots out of seven had average mean
altitude deviations greater than 150 feet in Segment III, and two
other pilots had average mean airspeed deviations greater than 15
knots in Segment III. For the Combined scenario, the number of
saturated pilots rose to three for the altitude deviations ana
remained at 2 for the airspeed deviations.
Within each scenario, there was no significant correlation
between airspeed and altitude deviations. This was due to some
evidence of altitude and airspeed control trade-offs for various
individuals during all four scenarios. However, overall airspeed
and altitude control correlated at a 95 percent confidence level
when considering the four scenarios together. The Baseline and
Planning scenarios had low deviations for each score and the
Activity and Combined scenarios had high deviations for both scores.
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5.3 SUBJECTIVE RATING RESULTS
The Subjective Rating data was useful because it illustrated
the impression these scenarios were making in the minds of the
pilots. Thus, although only an indirect measure, one would expect
these ratings to provide a better indication of mental workload than
objective performance data.
Table 15 presents the average overall subjective rating for
each pilot, scenario, and subjective category. Table 16 gives the
ratings averaged over all the pilots for each segment, scenario, and
category. Note that the standard deviation data in Table 16 is very
consistent from rating to rating and scenario to scenario. It did
not exhibit the wide variations present in the altitude and airspeed
deviation data.
First, how well did each of the five ratings distinguish
between the predominantly manual control oriented Activity scenario,
the predominantly mental workload oriented Planning scenario, ana
the Combined scenario? ACTIVITY LEVEL ratings did not reliably
distinguish between the Activity and Planning scenarios. The pilots
apparently felt equally active in both, although the activities were
of a fundamentally different nature. However, the difference
between the Combined scenario and both of the others was significant
at a 98 percent confidence level. Overall ratings are plotted in
Figure 46.
COMPLEXITY rating results were similar. There was no
significant difference between the Activity and Planning scenarios,
but there was a difference between these scenarios and the Combined
scenario at a 99 percent confidence level. See Figure 47.
DIFFICULTY ratings were somewhat different. As shown in
Figure 48, the Activity scenario was rated slightly more difficult
(80 percent confidence level) than the Planning scenario. The
Combined scenario was considered more difficult than the Activity
scenario (90 percent confidence) and definitely more difficult than
the Planning scenario (99.9 percent confidence). Because the
Activity and Combined scenarios were similar in all other respects,
this difference in difficulty level is solely due to an added
planning workload.
STRESS ratings indicated the Activity scenario was slightly
more stressful than the Planning scenario (80 percent confidence
level). However, as can be seen in Figure 49, the Combined scenario
was definitely more stressful than either of the other two scenarios
(99 percent confidence).
Finally, WORKLOAD ratings for the Activity and Planning
scenarios were similar. The Combined scenario had a higher workload
than the Activity scenario (90 percent confidence) or the Planning
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Table 15: Average Subjective Ratings for each pilot
(Adjusted)
BASELINE
Activity Level
Complexity
Difficulty
Stress
Workload
ACTIVITY
Activity Level
Complexity
Difficulty
Stress
Workload
PLANNING
Activity Level
Complexity
Difficulty
Stress
Workload
COMBINED
Activity Level
Complexity
Difficulty
Stress
Workload
Pilot
A.
5.0
4.7
4.0
3.7
2.4
7.6
3.7
6.4
4.1
6.1
3.2
3.2
2.9
3.2
4.1
9.1
6.9
5.7
8.1
7.1
B
2.7
2.4
3.1
2.3
2.4
7.3
4.1
6.9
5.4
5.4
5.6
4.5
4.4
5.6
6.4
9.0
5.7
8.4
8.2
8.4
C
2.1
1.6
1.4
1.8
1.2
4.4
3.8
3.7
3.8
2.5
7.6
7.2
6.5
2.4
7.0
8.3
10.1
10.7
7.5
10.3
D
2.7
3.5
2.6
2.4
2.3
6.6
4.9
6.0
5.3
5.7
5.6
4.6
3.9
5.4
4.2
7.1
5.7
7.3
7.6
7.6
E
2.8
2.6
2.5
2.5
2.4
7.8
7.2
6.5
6.5
6.8
4.4
4.6
4.5
4.6
4.4
8.8
7.6
8.1
8.9
8.8
F
2.8
2.9
2.9
2.6
2.8
5.8
5.6
6.0
5.5
6.4
5.3
4.6
4.4
3.2
4.2
7.4
7.1
6.6
5.9
6.2
G
2.9
2.1
2.1
1.3
2.1
6.1
3.5
4.7
3.5
5.3
6.1
5.4
5.3
4.7
4.0
6.3
5.5
6.4
5.2
5.5
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Table 16: Average Subjective Ratings for each Segment
(Adjusted)
SCENARIO
BASELINE
Activity Level
Complexity
Difficulty
Stress
Workload
ACTIVITY
Activity Level
Complexity
Difficulty
Stress
Workload
PLANNING
Activity Level
Complexity
Difficulty
Stress
Workload
COMBINED
Activity Level
Complexity
Difficulty
Stress
Workload
SEGMENT
I
2.6
2.3
2.2
2.0
1.8
5.4
3.4
4.5
3.7
3.9
4.1
4.1
3.3
3.3
3.9
5.9
5.4
5.9
5.5
5.7
II
2.8
2.5
2.4
2.1
2.2
6.7
5.0
6.0
4.9
5.5
5.1
4.6
4.0
3.9
4.7
8.3
6.9
7.8
7.6
7.7
III
3.5
3.4
3.1
3.0
2.8
7.3
5.7
6.7
6.1
7.0
7.0
5.9
6.3
5.3
6.2
9.8
8.5
9.1
8.9
9.6
Overall
3.0
2.7
2.6
2.4
2.3
6.5
4.7
5.7
4.9
5.5
5.4
4.8
4.6
4.2
4.9
8.0
6.9
7.6
7.3
7.7
Std Dev
0.9
1.0
0.8
0.7
0.5
1.2
1.3
1.1
1.1
1.4
1.4
1.3
1.1
1.2
1.2
1.1
1.6
1.7
1.3
1.6
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Figure 46: Average subjective ACTIVITY LEVEL ratings for the
Baseline (B), Activity (A), Planning (P),
and Combined (C) scenarios
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Figure 47: Average subjective COMPLEXITY ratings for the
Baseline (B), Activity (A), Planning (P),
and Combined (C) scenarios
105
10 r-
RATING
UNITS
• A
Segments
A
Overall
Figure 48: Average subjective DIFFICULTY ratings for the
Baseline (B) , Activity (A), Planning (P) ,
and Combined (C) scenarios
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Figure 49: Average subjective STRESS ratings for the
Baseline (B), Activity (A), Planning (P),
and Combined (C) scenarios
107
scenario (99.9 percent confidence). See Figure 50.
The Planning scenario was essentially a Baseline scenario with
an added mental workload component. The Activity scenario was a
Baseline scenario complicated by a great deal of manual control
work. The Combined scenario was a combination of the Activity and
Planning scenarios. Therefore, the construction of the scenarios
and the results plotted in Figures 46 to 50 led me to investigate
whether this construct was reflected in the subjective ratings.
For all five ratings, I found the incremental difference
between the Baseline scenario and each of the other three
scenarios. I then examined how the sum of these increments for the
Activity and Planning scenarios compared with the incremental
Combined ratings. For example, suppose that the Baseline rating'for
Difficulty was 3.0 and the Difficulty ratings for the Activity,
Planning, and Combined scenarios were 5.0, 5.3, and 7.5
respectively. The incremental ratings for the Activity, Planning,
and Combined ratings would then be 2.0, 2.3, and 4.5. The sum of
the Activity and Planning scenario increments would be 4.3. This
increment (averaged.with the increments for all the other pilot's
increments) was compared with the Combined scenario's increment of
4.5 (averaged with the other pilot's Combined scenario increments).
The sum of the Activity and Planning increments for the
Complexity, Difficulty, Stress, and Workload ratings was not
statistically different from the- incremental Combined ratings. The
Activity Level rating did show a potential difference between the
Combined rating and the sum, but at a low, 70 percent confidence
level. The sum of the Activity Level ratings for the Activity and
Planning scenarios is greater than the Combined scenario rating.
In view of the well established fact that the magnitude of
subjective perception is logarithmically related to stimulus
magnitude, this nearly linear response was somewhat surprising. At
no point were the pilots ever told that the Combined scenario
contained the sum of manual and mental tasks from the Activity and
Planning scenarios.
Another item of interest was whether these five ratings
differed from each other for each of the three non-Baseline
scenarios. Table 17 lists confidence levels for a statistically
significant difference between the ratings for the Activity
scenario-. The Activity Level ratings were different from the other
four ratings. Complexity ratings differed significantly from
Activity Level and Difficulty ratings. Difficulty ratings differed
from Activity Level, Complexity, and Stress. Stress Ratings
differed from Activity Level and Difficulty ratings. Workload
ratings differed primarily from Activity Level ratings. Overall,
the pilots found significant differences among these categories for
this manual control type of activity.
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Figure 50: Average subjective WORKLOAD ratings for the
Baseline (B), Activity (A), Planning (P),
and Combined (C) scenarios
L09
Table 17: Activity scenario: statistical confidence levels.
for differences between various subjective ratings
Activity Level
Complexity
Difficulty
Stress
Workload
Activity
Level
—
98
98
99
98
Complexity
98
—
90
40
80
Difficulty
98
90
—95
60
Stress
99
40
95
—
70
Workload
98
80
60
70
—
The Stress and Complexity ratings were similar. Both were
relatively low (Complexity: 4.7 average; Stress: 4.9 average). Some
of the pilots commented that pure, intense manual activity was
easier than pure, intense mental activity. This may explain why
this scenario was rated the least "complex" of the three
non-Baseline scenarios, and not very stressful.
Table 18 presents statistical difference data for the Planning
scenario. Activity Level, Complexity, and Difficulty ratings all
differed from each other. The Stress and Workload ratings were less
distinct. For this mentally difficult scenario, the Stress ratings
were similar to the Difficulty ratings. Workload ratings were
similar to the Complexity ratings. This is consistent with pilot
comments that most of their workload was related to the complex
nature of the "sorting" and "planning" required for this scenario.
Table 18: Planning scenario: statistical confidence levels
for differences between various subjective ratings
Activity Level
Complexity
Difficulty
Stress
Workload
Activity
Level
—
95
99
80
70
Complexity
95
—
98
60
20
Difficulty
99
98
—20
60
Stress
80
60
20
—
60
Workload
70
20
60
60
—
no
Table 19 shows that there was little difference among the
ratings for the Combined scenario. Only the Activity Level and
Stress ratings were significantly different. Apparently, the
subjects were successfully distinguishing between being busy and
being stressed. Both Stress and Workload ratings were similar to
the Difficulty rating. One possible explanation for these mostly
negative results is that the manual and mental workload was so high
that all of the ratings were high. Thus, perceptual differences
couldn't manifest themselves in the statistics.
Table 19: Combined scenario: statistical confidence levels
for differences between various subjective ratings
Activity Level
Complexity
Difficulty
Stress
Workload
Activity
Level
—
80
40
95
40
Complexity
SO
—
70
40
80
Difficulty
40
70
—
20
20
Stress
95
40
20
—
80
Workload
40
80
20
80
—
Just how difficult were these three scenarios? Section 4.2
explained that the Combined scenario had five times the activity
WU's of the Planning scenario and five times the planning WU's of
the Activity scenario. Section 5.2 showed that altitude and
airspeed deviations for the Combined scenario were much greater than
for the Planning scenario, although comparable to those for the
Activity scenario. Earlier in this section, the five subjective
ratings for the Combined scenario were all shown to be not only
greater than those of the Activity and Planning scenarios, but
roughly equal to the sums of the other two.
Was this Planning scenario more "difficult" than that of the
preliminary experiments? Altitude deviations were lower by a
statistically significant amount, but this can probably be .
attributed to the use of the autopilot this time. Activity Level
and Stress ratings were not statistically different, but Complexity,
Difficulty, and Workload were. Difficulty and Workload were
greater, at a confidence level of 80 percent. Complexity was
greater with 90 percent confidence.
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Since both were flown without autopilot, the two Activity
scenarios are more easily compared. Altitude deviations were
greater this time and both mean absolute and rms differences were
greater with 80 percent confidence. Complexity, Stress, and
Workload ratings were not statistically different, but Activity
Level and Difficulty ratings were. Difficulty ratings were higher
for the latest series, at an 80 percent confidence level. Activity
Level ratings were also higher, at a 95 percent level.
The only scenario which consistently "saturated" pilots was the
Combined scenario. If one defines a "saturated" pilot as one who
scores a subjective rating category at 9.0 or higher, the Activity
scenario was least likely to saturate pilots. This is interesting
because when there were significant differences between the Activity
and Planning scenario ratings, the Activity scenario rating was
always slightly higher. Thus, certain individuals found the
Planning scenario very difficult, while the pilots as a group, found
the Planning scenario slightly less demanding than the Activity
scenario.
For the Activity scenario, there was one saturated rating for
Workload. For the Planning scenario, there were two saturated
ratings for Activity Level, and one each for Difficulty and
Workload. For the Combined scenario, there were five saturated
ratings for Activity Level and Workload, four for Difficulty and
Stress, and two for Complexity.
These experiments verified that on a subjective level, a
difficult, purely mental task load can equal a difficult, purely
manual task load. In general, all the subjective category ratings
were similar for the Planning and Activity scenarios.
There was no consistent correlation between subjective ratings
and a pilot's experience level. This is not surprising since there
is no universal subjective mental metric. Two persons working
equally hard may rate their workloads very differently. They have
different utilities, and one person may use a linear scale while
another uses a logarithmic, and still another, an exponential scale.
Finally, unlike the altitude and airspeed data, all of the
subjective rating categories showed monotonically increasing ratings
for Segments I, II, and III. This relationship was valid for all
scenarios.
5.4 ALTITUDE AND AIRSPEED DEVIATION DATA VERSUS SUBJECTIVE RATINGS
I attempted to correlate altitude or airspeed deviations with
each pilot's subjective ratings. However, on an individual basis,
objective performance data and subjective ratings were
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uncorrelated. This result was not unexpected, and had been reported
previously. See, for example, the short discussion in Kantowitz,
Hart, and Bortolussi [11]. One possible reason is the "accumulator
effect" discussed in Section 1.7. Another reason is that no two
people have exactly the same internal metric for rating mental
workload. A third reason, suggested in [11], is that one rating may
be measuring instantaneous workload while the other is measuring
average workload.
One example of the "accumulator effect" can be seen in the data
for Pilot A. In flying the Activity scenario, his mean altitude
deviations for Segments II and III were 111.8 feet and lOb.O feet:
relatively constant. However, his corresponding Workload ratings
went from 5.8 for Segment II to 7.1'for Segment III. Thus, his
perceived workload was not equal to his performance.
There were also examples of several pilots having similar
performance but very different perceived workloads. For instance,
in Segment III of the Activity scenario, Pilots B and D had mean
altitude deviations of 143.6 feet and 147.8 feet, respectively.
However, Pilot B rated his workload at 8.3 while Pilot D rated his
only a 6.5.
Nevertheless, in the aggregate, objective performance data was
correlated with subjective ratings. Using Pearson's Product-Moment
Correlation Coefficient,."r"* rms altitude errors weakly correlated
with the corresponding subjective ratings for the Activity scenario
(See Table 20). Activity Level, Complexity, and Difficulty
correlated with an "r" of 0.8 (.805; .797; .807). For the Stress
and Workload ratings, "r" was about 0.9 (.911; .903).
Table 20: Pearson Product-Moment Correlation Coefficient
for aggregate Altitude Deviations and
Subjective Ratings
SCENARIO
DEVIATION TYPE
Activity Level
Complexity
Difficulty
Stress
Workload
Activity
mean rms
.401 .805
.389 .797
.403 .807
.583 .911
.568 .903
Planning
mean rms
.880 .782
.843 .777
.817 .746
.428 .792
.882 .823
Combined
mean rms
.986 .953
.999 .896
.990 .945
.986 .954
.999 .911
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Correlations were slightly better for the Planning scenario.
Mean absolute altitude deviations and Activity Level had an "r" of
.880. Complexity, Difficulty and Workload had "r's" of .843, .817,
and .882. Mean altitude errors did not correlate with Stress, but
rms errors did: .792. The ability of the rms error data to
correlate with Stress ratings better than the mean deviation data
did might be due to the fact that the rms data weights large errors
more heavily than small errors. Intuitively, beyond a certain
point, stress should be an exponential function of the magnitude of
deviations. Thus, large deviations would be better reflected in the
rms values and Stress ratings.
There was excellent correlation between mean absolute error
data and all five ratings for the Combined scenario. The lowest "r"
was for Stress, (.986) with Complexity having an "r" of .9999.
Because the pilots were heavily loaded during the Combined scenario,
they may have been operating near their personal limits. This may
have eliminated the "accumulator effect" and resulted in the good
correlation between objective performance data and the subjective
ratings.
Finally, Tulga and Sheridan 127J reported that once a subject
passed "saturation", performance deteriorated sharply. (Also see
Figure 4) While flying the Planning scenario, Pilot C crashed
during Segment III. Table 21 lists relevant data for Segments I,
II, and III for this pilot. Although he reported only low Stress,
the other four subjective factors sharply increased from Segment II
to Segment III. Likewise, note that his mean absolute and rms
altitude errors increased by 85 percent and 83 percent, and the
corresponding airspeed errors increased by 78 percent and 74 percent
from Segment II to Segment III. Although one can argue about which
was cause and which was effect, mental saturation accompanied a
severe performance degradation.
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Table 21: Example of related performance deterioration and
subjective saturation: Pilot C; Planning Scenario
Activity Level
Complexity
Difficulty
Stress
Workload
Altitude Error: Mean
RMS
Airspeed Error: Mean
RMS
SEGMENT
I
5.8
6.5
4.5
1.1
5.5
11.9
12.7
1.2
2.1
11
7.4
6.8
4.1
3.0
5.6
59.8
60.3
4.1
4.2
III
9.6
8.3
11.0
3.1
10.0
110.6
110.6
7.3
7.3
5.5 PLANNING/MEMORY TASK PERFORMANCE
The manner in which each pilot complied with planning task
requests was recorded during each run. This information provided
insight into the mental workload problem, and generated some
objective data on the mental process.
As workload increased, there were a number of ways that each
pilot could respond to these requests. They could fail to perform a
task, choosing not to do it or simply forgetting to do it. They
could perform the task incorrectly or do some unrequested task. Or,
the task might be performed at some time other than the directed
time.
Table 22 lists the percentage of planning tasks not performed
correctly for each scenario. This data is listed for each pilot and
segment. Overall error percentages are plotted in Figure 51.
Although the planning workload for the Baseline and Activity
scenarios was the same, the overall error percentage was much higher
for the Activity scenario. Similarly, although the Planning and
Combined scenarios had similar planning workloads, the Combined
scenario percentage was much higher. The Planning and Activity
scenarios had similar Subjective ratings, but their mental task
performance data was very different.
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Table 22: Planning Task error percentages
BASELINE
Segment
ACTIVITY
Segment
PLANNING
Segment
COMBINED
Segment
I:
II:
III:-
I:
II:
III:
I:
II:
III:
I:
II:
HI:
Pilot
A
0
0
0
100
0
0
7
67
43
64
B
0
0
100
100
0
29
14
0
71
57
C
33
N 0
0
100
N 0
100
0
0
Crash
33
71
86
0
0
T A S
0
0
T A S
0
0
14
0
0
43
29
E
0
K S
0
0
K S
100
50
0
0
0 ,
43
21
F
0
0
100
100
25
14
18
67
29
57
G
0
0
0
0
0
14
0
0
43
7
The Combined scenario results were statistically different from
the Planning scenario results at a 99 percent confidence level.
Activity scenario results differed from the Combined scenario at an
80 percent confidence level.
As an examination of Table 22 would indicate, the standard
deviations for the overall error percentages varied widely from
scenario to scenario. For the Baseline and Planning scenarios where
the error percentages were low, standard deviations were only 8.8
and 13.4 percent respectively. The difficult Combined scenario had
a standard.deviation of 27.2 percent, indicating more variability
among the pilots . The Activity scenario showed the greatest
variability. The low number of mental tasks and the high error
percentages for some pilots resulted in a standard deviation of 51.4.
Examining the error data for each segment, the performance for
the Planning and Combined scenarios was virtually identical for
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Figure 52: Percentages of planning/memory task errors per segment
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Segment I. However, for Segments II and III, the difference between
the two scenarios was significant at the 99.9 percent confidence
level. On a segment by segment basis, there are too few data points
to provide standard deviation data of any value. In general, pilot
performance fluctuated a great deal at this level. Figure 52
illustrates the error percentages for each segment and scenario.
The data suggests that at low or moderate levels, manual
control workload does not affect mental performance. Sufficient
cognitive reserve exists to handle all tasks. However, at
relatively high manual control levels, cognitive reserves disappear
and mental performance deteriorates. Figure 51 suggests that this
mental deterioration may even be evident for low levels of mental
tasking.
The preliminary experiments showed a distinct difference in the
degree pilots complied with "positional" and "non-positional" memory
tasks. A positional task concerned the aircraft's state. For
example, 'the task might be to climb 1000 feet at some point.
Non-positional tasks were other types of requests, such as to
contact ARTCC at some point.
The preliminary experiment results were unexpected. However,
there were not a large number of memory tasks in the preliminary
experiments, so the results were statistically suspect. Therefore,
this new set'of experiments was designed to better illustrate any
differences between the two types of tasks by drastically increasing
the number of such tasks. Table 23 lists the percentage of each
type of task not performed correctly. The data is broken down for
each pilot by segment and type of task.
Statistical analysis of the data showed no significant
difference in pilot compliance with these two types of tasks. There
was, however, a weak indication (70 percent confidence level) that
error percentages for both types of tasks increased as workload
increased. That is, errors were more likely in Segment III than in
Segment I.
This information was also examined to see if the length of time
between task request and task execution made any difference for
these two types of planning tasks. No statistically significant
differences were found.
The various planning tasks were also categorized as Long-term,
Medium-term, or Short-term based upon the length of time the pilot
had from receiving the task to performing it. Table 24 lists the
percentages of improperly performed tasks for these three time
periods. The data is only for the Combined and Planning scenarios
because the Baseline and Activity scenarios simply had a few
Medium-term tasks. Table 24 contains data for each pilot and each
segment.
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Table 23: Percentage of Positional (P) and
Non-Positional (NP) task errors
PLANNING
Segment I:
II:
III:
Overall:
COMBINED
Segment I:
II:
III:
Overall :
P
NP
P
NP
P
NP
P
NP
P
NP
P
NP
P
NP
P
NP
. Pilot
A
0
—
0
0
0
9
0
7
67
—
50
33
100
44
75
42
B
0
—
67
0
0
18
25
13
0
—
100
33
80
44
67
42
C
0
—
0
0
Crash
Crash
0
0
33
—
75
67
. 80
89
67
83
D
0
—
33
0
0
0
13
0
0
—
25
67
40
22
25
33
E
50
—
0
0
0
0
13
0
0
—
25
67
60
11
33
25
F
25
—
33
0
0
23
19
17
67
—
25
33
20.
78
33
67
G
0
—
0
33
0
0
0.
7
0
—
25
67
0
11
8
25
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Table 24: Error percentages for Long-term (L) ,
Medium-term (M), and Short-term (S)
planning tasks
PLANNING
Segment I:
Segment II:
Segment III:
Overall:
COMBINED
Segment I:
Segment II:
Segment III:
Overall:
S
M
L
S
M
L
S
M
L
S
M
L
S
M
L
S
M
L
S
M
L
S
M
L
Pilot
A
0
0
—
0
0
0
11
0
0
7
0
0
67
—
—
75
0
0
78
33
50
81
20
33
B
0
0
—
0
50
100
0
33
50
0
33
67
0
—
—
50
100
100
56
67
50
44
80
67
C
0
0
—
0
0
0
Crash
Crash
Crash
0
0
0
33
—
—
100
50
.0
89
67
100
81
60
67
D
0
0
—
0
50
0
0
0
0
0
17
0
0
—
—
25
50
100
44
0
0
31
20
33
E
U
100
—
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
17
0
0
—
—
75
0
0
33
0
50
38
0
33
F
50
0
—
25
0
0
28
0
0
29
0
0
67
—
—
50
0
0
33
100
100
44
60
67
G
0
0
—
0
50
0
0
0
0
0
17
0
0
—
—
50
50
0
0
33
0
13
40
0
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When aggregated for each scenario, this data yields the plot
shown in Figure 53. Analyzing the error percentages, there was no
statistically significant difference within each scenario for the
three different task time spans. This was probably because the
pilots were allowed to take notes. Additional errors probably arose
in the Short-term tasks when the pilots struggled to plan and
perform these tasks in a very busy environment. Thus, they would
miss some tasks or perform them late. This balanced the errors
engendered in the Long-term tasks by the pilots forgetting about
tasks.
This hypothesis is supported by the data in Table 25. It lists
the number of errors committed by each pilot for each task time
span. These errors are classified as errors of Omission CO: did
nothing), Commission (C: did something wrong), or Timing (T: did
something too early or too late). Mote that a large number of the
short-term and medium-term errors were the result of timing, whereas
no long-term errors were due to mistiming.
However, planning task errors for all three time spans_were
affected by manual-control activity. Note in Figure 53 that the two
low manual workload scenarios (Baseline and Planning) had low error
percentages while both high manual workload scenarios (Activity and
Combined) had high error percentages. The Activity scenario had a
high error percentage even though its planning workload was low.
Looking only at the two high planning workload scenarios,
(Planning .and Combined) the differences bewtween the scenarios was
statistically significant for all three time spans. Differences
were significant at an 80 percent confidence level for medium-length
tasks, at a 95 percent level for long-term tasks, and 98 percent
level for short-term tasks. Thus, the level of manual control was
again decisive in determining mental performance.
I chose not to plot or list the standard deviations for this
segment-by-segment data. Once again, the data was too coarse and
individual pilot performance was too variable to make this
information useful.
Figures 54, 55, and 56 illustrate Short-term, Medium-term, and
Long-term error percentages for each Segment and scenario.
Examining Figure 54, differences between the Planning and Combined
scenarios for Short-term planning tasks were not statistically
significant in Segment I. Differences were at a 70 percent
confidence level. However, the differences were at a 98 percent
confidence level for Segments II and III, when workloads were higher.
Referring to Figure 55 for Medium-term task results,
differences between the Planning and Baseline or between the
Planning and Activity scenarios were insignificant for Segment I
(20 percent confidence level). The Planning and Combined scenario
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Table 25: Types and numbers of Long-term, Medium-term,
and Short-term planning errors
SCENARIO
PLANNING
Long:
Medium:
Short:
Overall:
COMBINED
Long:
Medium:
Short:
Overall:
0:
C:
T:
0:
C:
T:
0:
C:
T:
0:
C:
T:
0:
C:
T:
0:
C:
T:
0:
C:
T:
0:
C:
T:
Pilot
A B C D E F
1 . . . .
1 . . . .
.
.
1 . 1 . .
1 . . 1 .
• • • • • •
. • . 1
1 . . . . 4
1 . .
2 . 1 . 1
1 1 . . 1 4
G
.
.
.
.
.
1
.
.
•
.
.
1
1 2 2 1 1 2 .
2 3 . . 1
.
1 2 . 1 . 2
8 4 1 2 4 5 4
.
5 3 . 1 1 2
9 8 17 5 6 7
.
6 5 . 2 1 4
1
.
1
.
*
2
1
.
3
Note: 0 = Omission; C = Comission; T = Timing Error
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Figure 53: Error percentages for three different planning
task time spans
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Figure 54: Short-term planning/memory task error
percentages by segment
123
70 -
PERCENTAGE
50
ACTIVITY
x
x
x
X COMBINED
x
x
'• PLANNING
.-, BASELINE
2 3
SEGMENT
Figure 55: Medium-term planning/memory task error
percentages by segment
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Figure 56: Long-term planning/memory task error
percentages by segment
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errors were statistically indestinguishable for Segment II.
However, in Segment III, the highest workload segment, the Combined
scenario errors were higher than the Planning scenario errors (90
percent confidence level). The Planning and Activity difference was
even greater: a 95 percent confidence level. The Combined and
Activity scenarios were different, but at a much lower confidence
level (80 percent). Again, at high overall workload levels, the
presence of a high manual workload made a significant difference.
Figure 56 is a plot of the Long-term planning task results. In
Segment II, the Planning and Combined scenarios were statistically
indestinguishable. However, at the higher workload level of
Segment III, the error percentage for the Combined scenario was
clearly greater (90 percent confidence level).
The Activity and Planning scenarios had moderate manual or
mental workloads. At these levels, error percentages were similar
for all of the pilots. However, some differences arose for the high
workload Combined scenario. Refering to Table 25, the average
number of planning task errors for the low experience and high
experience pilots were very different. The low experience pilots
(A and B) averaged 14.0 task errors while the high experience pilots
(D, E, F, and G) averaged 7.3 task errors. Thus, there were signs
of experience related saturation in this mental performance data
which was much less obvious in the objective performance data and
subjective rating data. This difference was verified at a
95 percent confidence level.
" The number of individual planning errors and individual
altitude or airspeed deviations were not correlated. Nor were
planning errors and subjective ratings. However, in aggregate, all
three measures increased with increasing workload.
5.6 PILOT COMMENTS
The planning task instructions given to the pilots were not
always in chronological order. This was done to make the planning
function more difficult, more complex, and to increase overall
workload without further increasing the number of assigned tasks.
This strategy apparently worked, since several subjects mentioned
that instructions "mixed in time" were difficult to organize.
With the exception of ETA's (Estimated Times of Arrival) and
Clearance times, most ATC to pilot instructions are linked to a
geographic point. For example, ATC may direct, "climb 1000 feet,
now", or "climb to Flight Level 290 at Knoxville VOR". In this
experiment, the pilots were usually told to do something at a
certain elapsed time. This was done primarily to make the pacing
more uniform across runs and subjects, and to aid in analyzing the
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data. However, the pilots remarked that tasks required at a certain
time were harder to remember than tasks required at a place. This
was consistent with their experience and indicated that there was an
unintentional, but experimentally welcome, boost in mental workload
due to this request format.
Individual pilots found the autopilot to be either a hindrance
or a great help. Several pilots stated that when things "really got
busy", the autopilot was the only thing which kept workload at a
manageable level. But, several pilots reported that having to plan
how to use the autopilot was worse than the demanding manual control
work. With purely manual control, they said you "simply do what you
need to do." It should be mentioned, however, that the pilots who
disliked the autopilot had thousands of hours of flight time but
little previous experience with autopilots. This appears to be an
example of highly skilled operators preferring to function in a
familiar mode rather than sit, think, and program a machine: the
kind of mental workload problem which initially instigated studies
of this type.
There was a general consensus that Mental Workload was best
reflected in the Stress and Workload subjective ratings.
A number of the pilots stated that planning and memory items
tended to get second priority to immediate task demands. This is
consistent with the finding that a high activity workload
significantly increased planning task errors. Pilots were obeying
the prime directive taught every student pilot: "First, fly the
aircraftl" These statements and results are also consistent with
Tulga and Sheridan's finding that subjects don't plan ahead when
they're very busy [27].
Finally, the pilots mentioned four non-experiment-specific
items which increased mental stress and workload. One was the
"annoyance" factor caused by having too many things to do or by
being interrupted before completing a task. This type of problem is
common on final approach when the need to fly arid/or monitor
equipment, clear for other aircraft, look for the runway, interact
with ATC, and run aircraft checklists, combine to make the flight
deck a busy, stressful environment.
A second item was the effect of "getting behind". Again, this
is most likely to occur when things get very busy. The stress
generated by a lengthening "mental queue", combined with the
possible need to modify a former plan, increases the perceived
workload.
Similarly, abnormal events significantly increase workload.,
disrupt concentration, and increase the frustration level. These
effects have been discussed in the open literature. See, for
example, [5], [9], and [25].
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The fourth item concerned the effect of adding an increment of
workload when the workload is already high. As the pilot becomes
task saturated, additional tasks must be prioritized, added to a
mental queue, or ignored. This increases stress, frustrates the
pilot, and increases his mental manipulations. These factors result
in lower performance, increased mental workload, and lower safety
margins. For additional discussion, see Tulga and Sheridan [27],
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Chapter 6
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
6.1 MAJOR FINDINGS
1. The number of additional assigned mental tasks haa no
statistically significant impact on the degree of aircraft control.
The level of manual workload was the decisive factor. Vvueu mental
workload was high but manual workload was low, altitude and airspeed
deviations were small. When mental workload was lov but manual
workload was high, altitude and airspeed deviations were large.
2. Incremental subjective ratings were calculated relative to
the ratings for a Baseline scenario. The incremental rating for a
high manual workload scenario added to the incremental rating for a
high mental workload scenario was equal to the incremental rating
for a scenario which combined both types of workloads.
3. The type of scenario (manual or mental) and the degree of
workload determined whether the five Subjective Rating categories
(Activity Level, Complexity, Difficulty, Stress, and Workload) were
perceived as similar or different.' The pilots found differences in
the meanings of the five categories for a scenario with a moderately
high manual workload. When mental workload was moderately high,
Stress ratings were similar to the Difficulty ratings, and Workload
ratings were similar to the Complexity ratings. For a combination
of very high manual and mental workloads, Activity Level and Stress
were distinguishable, but distinctions among the other ratings were
blurred. Workload and Difficulty were correlated, and Stress and
Difficulty ratings were similar.
4. Subjective ratings given by individual pilots during the
high manual workload scenario were very similar. However, there
were individual differences in the subjective ratings for the high
mental workload scenario. Some pilots were not stressed by the
mental tasks while others significantly increased their subjective
ratings.
5. At low or moderate manual and mental workload levels,
aircraft deviations and memory task performance did not correlate
with the subjective ratings. At high workload levels, the
correlation was very good. It's possible that at lower workloads,
there is reserve mental capacity which varies from pilot to pilot,
affecting performance and ratings. At high workload levels, all
pilots may be tapping most or all of their mental capacity,
resulting in much greater consistency between performance and the
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subjective ratings.
6. The magnitude of manual workload was decisive in determining
the ability of the pilots to handle mental tasks. A mentally
difficult, manually easy scenario resulted in a low percentage of
mental errors. A mentally easy, manually difficult scenario
resulted in a high percentage of mental errors. The manual activity
was presumably consuming a great deal of the pilots' mental
processing capacity, even when they were not aware of it. This
finding was equally valid for long-term, medium-term, and short-term
mental tasks.
7. Under conditions of high manual and mental workload, the low
experience pilots did not perform mental tasks as well as the high
experience pilots did. however, objective performance and
subjective ratings were similar for the two groups. Thus, these
experiments suggest that monitoring and measuring mental performance
might be a more sensitive indicator of mental workload and reserve
mental capacity than the other measures.
6.2 RECOMMENDATIONS
These experiments produced a mountain of raw data. 1 analyzed
a great deal of the data and examined the relationships between many
different variables. However, I did not exhaust all possibilities.
There are still a number of variables which could be compared,
examining correlations and differences.
It may be. enlightening to "filter" the airspeed and altitude
data. I measured all deviations to derive mean absolute errors and
rms errors. Although, in theory, all pilots strive to maintain
desired altitudes and airspeeds perfectly, they often induce small
errors to provide sensory feedback and gain additional information
on the aircraft's performance. In addition, pilots tend to fly
within individual tolerances. These tolerances change, depending on
such factors as height above the ground, airspeed stall margin,
meteorological conditions, physical and mental states, and a number
of personal factors which affect an individual's utilities.
One might filter the altitude and airspeed data to account for
these tolerances. Considering all airspeed deviations less than
+ 5 knots and all altitude deviations less than ± 50 feet as zero
deviations may radically change the results, better separating the
low from the high expedience pilots, or more readily determining
which pilots were saturated. For actual flight checks, permissable
performance is usually +' 10 knots and + 100 feet. Using these .
limits would provide a still coarser data set. Comparisons between
results obtained from such data and this study might be enlightening.
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Subjective Ratings should be used in future studies of mental
workload. They provide a useful, if imprecise, measure of the
pilot's mental state.
The only significant difference found between the low
experience and high experience pilots was in their performance of
mental planning tasks. This should be further investigated in
future studies.
This study also found that objective manual performance data
and subjective ratings were correlated at high workload levels. If
verified by a new series of experiments, this might provide a useful
group metric for mental workload.
There was a linear relationship between the subjective ratings
of scenarios with different workloads when those ratings were
measured relative to a baseline scenario. The ratings for a
scenario with high manual workload were added to the ratings of a
mentally difficult scenario and found equal to the ratings of a
scenario which combined those manual and mental tasks. Future
studies should test and define the limits of this apparent linearity.
For future variations on these experiments, several changes may
be useful. First, the experimenter may choose to acid an aircraft
checklist. When the pilots were approaching the Localizer course or
on final approach, they had to fly, make radio calls to a simulated
ATC, and configure the aircraft, navigational aids, and autopilot.
However, they did not have a checklist to process. Vvhen added to
all the other necessary tasks, this "necessary evil" can be a
significant burden on final approach. Adding such a checklist would
also increase the realism of the simulated flight environment.
Second, further examinations of the effect of memory time span
on mental workload should eliminate the medium-term tasks and
concentrate on short-term versus long-term differences. It might
also be beneficial to use fewer simultaneous mental tasks and to
eliminate the note pad which I provided for the pilots' use. 'ihis
would further emphasize the memory aspect of mental workload while 1
emphasized the planning component of mental workload.
Third, I recommend eliminating the autopilot from future
experiments. Not only will this make it easier and less time
consuming to train future volunteers, but it will also reduce one
variable, simplifying analysis. Furthermore, based on the results
of these experiments, eliminating its use would help keep the manual
workload level high. The most interesting effects were found at
high manual workload levels.
Anyone analyzing this data for a future study might consider
eliminating the data for Pilot C. Although he was near the mean in
terms of experience, he consistently had the greatest altitude and
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airspeed deviations and the largest number of mental task errors.
In addition, his subjective ratings were consistently at the
extremes of the group's ratings. In fact, his ratings were usually
abnormally low, indicating that he thought the scenarios were easier
than did the other pilots.
Finally, a researcher might perform multivariate analyses and
employ other sophisticated mathematical techniques to further
examine performance, perceptions, and the interrelationship of the
two.
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Appendix 1
SIMULATION AND FLIGHT DYNAMICS
A-l.l SIMULATION FLIGHT DYNAMICS
The basic flight dynamics for the aircraft simulation were
modelled on the Lockheed Jetstar, a four engine business jet. The
Jetstar's longitudinal and lateral stability derivatives were
obtained from NASA CR-2144 [6]. The simulation used the
coefficients for Mach 0.230 (152 kts) at Sea Level. This provided
good fidelity for final approach flight characteristics and did not
adversely affect handling qualities until airspeed exceeded
Mach 0.340 (225 kts). Beyond Mach 0.340, handling gradually becomes
more sensitive.
Figure 57, taken from McRuer, Ashkenas, and Graham lib], shows
the nomenclature used for defining the stability derivatives'
velocities, forces, and moments. Table 2b gives the desired
longitudinal and lateral stability derivatives. The derivatives in
the NASA document were in English units (feet, radians, seconds) and
in body axes. These coefficients were translated into stability
axes and then converted into MKS units (meters, kilograms, seconds)
for the simulation.
The linearized differential equations in Laplace form for the
flight dynamics are:
Longitudinal Dynamics:
s-X
u
-
Zu (l
-M
u
Where: a
6
u
g
-X.*s-X -X *s+g*cos(gam, )
Jn-Z.)s-Z C-Un-Z )s+g*sin(gam.JU O Q 0 q 0
-M.*s-M s(s-M )
a a q
u
a
b
=
Y
z .o
M.0
= alpha (angle of attack) [radians]
= theta (pitch angle) [radians]
= perturbed airspeed [ m/sec] U = U + u
- 9.8 [m/sec2]
*6
= gamma, (trimmed flight path angle; negative is
downward) [radians]
= pitch angle rate
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Figure 57: Vehicle-fixed axis system and notation
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Table 26: Aerodynamic Coefficients for the Lockheed Jetstar
UQ - 78.196 [m/sec] 152 [knots]
X
u
X
w
X.
w.
X q
X6
el
X6
°th
Z
u
Zw
Z.
w
Zq
Z6
el
Z
a
. °th
Mu
M
»w
M.
w
Mq
M6
el
M6th
CR-2144 (body axes)
-0.00456 [I/sec]
0.164 [I/sec]
0.0
0.0
2.78 [ft/sec2rad]
0.000842 [ft/sec2rad]
-0.103 [I/sec]
-0.723 [I/sec]
0.0
0.0 [ft/radsec]
-14.0 [ft/sec2rad]
0.0 [ft/sec2rad]
0.00175 [1/ftsec]
-0.00902 [1/ftsec]
-0.000834 [I/f t]
-0.582 [I/sec]
-2.80 [l/sec2rad]
-0. 00000604 [ l/sec2rad]
(stab, axes)
-0.02004
0.024815
0.0077789
0.0008259
-0.2421889
-0.7075117
-14.27334
-0.0001604
-0.0000353,
-0.0091881
-0.0008181
-0.582
-2.80
-0.00000604
MKS Units
X ='-0.0200417 [I/sec]
u
X - 1.94043 [m/sec2]
a
X. = 0.0a
X = 0.0q
X = 0.002371 [m/sec2rad]
°el
X =0. 0002517 [m/sec2rad]
°th
Z - -0.2421889 [I/sec]
u
Zw - -55.324584 [m/sec2]
Z. = 0.0 [m/sec]
Z = 0.0 [m/radsec]q
Z. = -4. 350514 [m/sec2r ad]o
el
Z =-0. 0000488 [m/sec2rad]
6th
M - -0.0001158 [I/msec]
M - -2.3613417 [I/sec2]
a
M. - -0.2102517 [I/sec]
a
M - -0.582 [I/sec]q
Mx = -2.80 [l/sec2rad]
el
M.. =-0.00000604 [I/ sec2rad]
6th
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Table 26, continued
YBeta
YBeta
YP
Y
\u
Y<5rud
f
Seta
1
Seta
•
L
P
?
L
r
t
LA6ail
I
rud
Seta
NMf
i
N
P
»
N
r
N *
6all
N6
rud
CR-2144 (body axes)
-25.8 [ft/sec2]
0.0 [ft/sec]
0.0 [1/rad]
0.0 [1/rad]
0.0 [ft/sec2rad]
0.0244 [ft/sec2rad]
-3.42 [I/sec2]
0.0 [I/sec]
-0.752 [I/sec]
0.234 [I/ sec]
1.04 [l/sec2rad]
0.533 [l/sec2rad]
1.10 [I/sec2]
0.0 [I/sec]
-0.173 [I/sec]
-0.172 [I/sec]
-0.0864 [l/sec2rad]
-0.580 [l/sec2rad]
(stab, axes)
-25.8
0.0244
-3.14121
-0.7184954
0.3422086
1.0034
0.4101933
1.74333
-0.0647908
-0.205504
-0.2367578
-0.672237
MKS Units
Y = -7.86384 [m/sec2]U6 L&
YBeta= °'° [m/sec]
Y - 0.0 [1/rad]
P
Yr - 0.0 [1/rad]
Y. =0.0 [m/sec2rad]
6ail
Y6 =1.9079824 [m/sec2rad]
rud
Seta" -3'14121 [I/sec2]
LBeta= °'° tl/sec ]
L = -0.7184954 [I/sec]
P
Lf = 0.3422086 [I/ sec]
L, = 1.0034 [l/sec2rad]
6ail
L^ =0.4101933 [l/sec2rad]
rud
N* - 1.74333 [I/sec2]
JjQ t<3.
NBeta= °'° [1/secl
N* = -0.0649708 [I/sec]
N = -0.205504 [I/ sec]
N* =-0.2867578[l/sec2rad]
6ail
N^ =-0.672237 [l/sec2rad]
rud
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Lateral Dynamics:
(l\ —V ~)ti—V -Y *tU0 *Beta'S *Beta p r p
•
LBet:a*S~LBeta
*s—NI
 n . all..Beta Beta
s(s-L )-tan(gam.,) s-(L -L *tan(gamu))
t ? i
-N *s s-(N -N *tan(gamn))p r p 0
Beta
Phi L.
o
N,0
*6
Where: Beta
Phi
r
P
side slip angle [radiansJ
roll angle [radians]
yaw rate [rad/sec]
roll rate [rad/sec]
L. + (1 /I )N.
' _ 1 XZ X 1
1
 1 - (I 2/I I )
XZ X Z
N,
Ni + (Ixz/Iz)Li
1 - (I 2/I I )
XZ X Z
The coefficients from Table 26 were used to generate aircraft
dynamics equations in a linear state-variable form: x = Ax + By. A
separate program generated the A and B matrix coefficients for the
longitudinal and lateral modes. The matrices for the longitudinal
case are:
x = [u a q 9] , y =
A =
X +X
u
Z
u
M +M
u
.Z /c
a u
/c
.Z /c
a u
0
X +X
a
Z
.Z
a
/c
a
/c
a
M +M
a
.Z
a
U
/c
a
Va(U0
(U
M +Mq
o+z
. (U
a
1
+Zq)/c -g*c0-x.t*g*s( 7c
)/c -g*s /cq U
o+z )/cq -M&*g*s0/c
0
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X, +X.Z, /c
o a 6 ,
el el
el
M, +M.Z, /c6
 n a 6 .el el
X, +X.Z.
6th a°th
Z, /c
6th
M, +M.Z,
6th a
Where: c
s
c
6
0
el
'th
cos(gamma )
sin(gamma )
Un-Z.0 a
elevator deflection
throttle position
For the lateral case, the matrices are:
x = [Beta p Phi r] , y = C6 ... 6 ]J
 ail rucr
YBeta/h
i t
L +L . Y /Beta Beta Beta
0
N -»!„. Yn /hBeta Beta Beta
Y /h
P
+L Y /hp Beta p
g*CQ/h
_. *g*cn/h L -L, (U.-YBeta 0 r Beta 0 r
tan (.gamma, )
j +M v /v. xi *u*r /h N — N (1) —V
p Beta p' Beta s O7 r Betav 0 r
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B =
Y, /h
6ail
L' +L*. Y, /h6 .. Beta 6
ail ail
Nx +N-... Y, /h6 ., Beta o .
 nail ail
/h
rud
L, +L.. Y, /ft6 , Beta 6
rud rud
N - +N... Y - / f t0 , Beta o .
rud rud
Where: h = Un-Y_.0 Beta
6 ,, = aileron deflection
ail
6 , = rudder deflection
rud
A-1.2 SIMULATOR SOFTWARE
Figure 58 is a basic diagram of the data sets and subroutines
for the simulator software.
The program begins by calling INITL. 1NI1L sets certain
constants, initializes the input keyboard, and configures the
MEGATEK display. To do this, INITL begins by calling hSETUt, a
subroutine for initializing and readying the MEGATEK for display
input. INITL next reads PERSV.DAT, a data set which contains
information needed by the MEGATEK for drawing a perspective
display. Then, PERSIN initializes the display with the PEKbV data.
KINIT initializes the inputs from the experimenter's keyboard.
INITL then reads BDAT.DAT. This data set contains constants which
initialize the aircraft's position, state, and configuration. It
also sets navigational aid coordinates and input parameters for the
aircraft Control Box. COEF then reads the aircraft's longitudinal
and lateral dynamics coefficients from MATR.DA'i.
The main program next calls ATCIN. ATCIN reads ATCN.DAT which
sets wind speeds, wind directions, wind regions, ceiling height, and
initializes certain automatic Air Traffic Control situations and
capabilities. These capabilities were not used in these experiments.
Once everything is initialized, the main program calls the FLY
subroutine: the actual flight simulation. FLY calls INPUT, a
subroutine which allows the experimenter to interrupt the
simulation, change conditions, or begin or terminate data storage.
INPUT calls DATREC which decides whether or not to store data. If
the inputs or conditions are proper for storing data, DA1REC calls
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DREG which records the data in memory. INPUT then calls KEY, a
subroutine which looks for and accepts keyboard inputs.
FLY then calls AUPI which determines the autopilot configu-
ration and autopilot pitch, roll, and throttle commands. For more
information on autopilot functions and dynamics, see Appendix 2.
Next comes the CWS routine. CWS stands for Control Wheel
Steering. When CWS is activated, it acts as a stability
augmentation system, smoothing aircraft dynamics. For more
information, see Appendix 2.
DYNAM1 calculates vehicle longitudinal response based on
autopilot or control box inputs, aircraft state, aircraft
configuration, and the linear state-variable matrices obtained trom
MATR.DAT. DYNAM2 performs a similar calculation for the vehicle's
lateral response.
The NAV1GA subroutine takes the data on the change in aircraft
state and uses it to calculate the new position, state, and position
relative to the VOR/DME or 1LS selected on the Control Box.
OUTPUT updates the MEGATEK display and stores data. OUTPUT
first calls DISPLY. D1SPLY calls PERS, whicn updates the
perspective display. Then DISPLY performs calculations on all the
relevant data to update the flight instrument display on the
MEGATEK. If requested, OUTPUT will store the desired data in a new
data set.
Although it wasn't used for these experiments, the program
contains a major subroutine called ATC. ATC provides a capability
for generating automatic ARTCC instructions on the MEGATEK display.
This capability was not used in these experiments because the high
pilot workload would have made it difficult for the pilots to read
the instructions. Also, since there were no audio cues available to
alert the pilot when an instruction appeared on the screen, the
chance of a busy pilot missing an instruction was great. It would
have been extremely difficult to determine if the pilots failed to
do something because they forgot to or if they simply missed the
instruction. This would have been unsatisfactory since a major part
of these experiments involved measuring the frequency with which
pilots forgot instructions.
ATC first calls A1RP which provides the current aircraft
position. Then, RPR determines which ARTCC sector the aircraft is
in. Sectors are defined in ATCN.DAT. RPR calls GCL to determine if
any ground controller instructions should be issued. If
instructions are necessary, GCL calls ATCR which generates the
desired ARTCC directions.
At this point, the main program returns to the FLY subroutine
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and continues looping until a stop command is issued through the
keyboard and registered by FLY's INPUT subroutine.
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MAIN
INITL
ATCIN
MSETUP
Read PERSV.DAT
PERSIN
KINU
Read BOAT.DAT
COEF
Read MATR.DAT
Read ATCM.DAT
FLY
ATC
INPUT
DATREC
DREG
KEY
AUPI
CWS
DYNAM1
DYNAM2
NAVIGA
OUTPUT
DISPLY
PERS
AIRP
RPR
GCL
ATCR
Figure 58: Principle simulation routines,
subroutines, and data sets
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Appendix 2
AUTOPILOT AND STABILITY AUGMENTATION SYSTEMS
A-2.1 CWS (CONTROL WHEEL STEERING) DYNAMICS
The CWS system is an optional flight control mode which
provides an inner feedback loop to improve aircraft control
characteristics. In Laplace form, the elevator and throttle
commands are generated by the following relations:
6.88 6
3.0q + 4.0 9
 +
6ct5000.0
'th "^»"» i.o + i.Us
Where: 6 , = pitch command
col r
6 , = throttle commandth
In the elevator command equation, q Cpitch rate) feedback
improves stability. The stick pitch command term makes the elevator
command proportional to stick position. The first-order lag term in
the throttle command equation simulates engine response lag.
The CWS aileron command for roll control is:
5.0625s 6 2.53125 6
6 .. = 4.5p + 0.39375r + 6.75Phi + , ,. . , ,. -I- - —
ail * 1.0 -t- 5.0s s
Where: 6 = lateral stick command
w
There are roll rate, yaw rate, and roll angle feedback terms in
the aileron command. The last two terms are important because they
result in the bank angle being proportional to the integrated value
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of the stick deflection.
Finally, the CWS rudder command is:
6 , = -3.0 Beta - 2.3 Beta
rud
The rudder command is a function of yaw angle and yaw rate.
The simple "mechanical" ratios for the system are:
6 . - 6.8fa 6 .
el col
6 , = 5000.0 6
th ct
6 ,, = 2.25 6
ail w
A-2.2 AUTOPILOT DYNAMICS
A-2.2.1 MANUAL HEADING MODE
The lateral autopilot's manual heading mode allows the
pilot to command a magnetic heading by turning a knob on the Control
Box. Turning the control knob slews an indicator on the HS1. The
autopilot will turn the aircraft in the shortest direction to the
heading set under the indicator. The stick deflection command
signal is:
6w = 2.5 [g.2 (psic - psijj Q>4- Phi]
Where: psic = commanded heading Cradians)
psi = present magnetic heading (radians)
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This mode will roll the aircraft into a 23° bank angle for any
heading error greater than approximately 19°. For errors less than
19°, bank angle is proportional to heading error. Note: when this
mode is engaged, any pilot lateral stick inputs are ignored.
A-2.2.2 VOR COUPLE MODE
In this lateral autopilot mode, the aircraft will turn to
intercept a chosen magnetic course relative to a selected VOR. The
Laplace equation which determines the stick deflection command is:
w
2.5 (-O.OOl)DME(l.O + 23.0s)(1.0 + 1.0s) VORE -1.0 VCRSE'] -
.75
-1.0 VCKSE -Phi
.4
Where: DME distance from the VOR or runway
VORE = difference between the selected VOR course radial
and the current VOR radial (radians)
VCRSE = angular difference between the selected VOR
course and the current aircraft magnetic heading
(radians)
The innermost bracket acts on the rate of change between the
desired VOR radial and the present one. This rate is artificially
limited to reduce sensitivity near the VOR. however, since this
bracket acts like a differentiator, it still produces rapid
corrections. The next bracket outward serves to limit the bank
angle response to a maximum of 23°. The outermost bracket commands
a stick deflection signal proportional to the difference between the
desired bank angle and the actual bank angle. The overall effect is
to command the bank angle to a certain value which is proportional
to the rate of VOR error. Pilot lateral stick inputs are ignored in
this mode.
A-2.2.3 LOCALIZER COUPLE MODE
The Localizer couple mode functions identically to the VOR
couple mode. The only difference is that errors are measured
relative to a Localizer course instead of a VOR course. All
dynamics and limits are identical.
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A-2.2.4 ALTITUDE HOLD MODE
This longitudinal autopilot mode produces a pitch command
input to maintain a commanded altitude. The pitch command is
generated by:
6 . = 0.0007 (H - HC) + 5.0 z
col l_ „„
 n. _J
+ DCZ
30.0
Where: H = present altitude (meters, MSL)
HC = commanded altitude (meters, MSL)
z = vertical velocity (m/sec)
DCZ = neutral stick position for pitch
This function compares present altitude to tne desirea
altitude, adjusts for the rate of climb or descent, and then adds
its signal to the "neutral stick" signal. In this mode, any pilot
pitch input is ignored. However, the pilot must still control
airspeed. If the pilot allows the airspeed to get low and has a low
power setting, the aircraft will stall.
A-2.2.5 SPEED HOLD MODE
This autopilot mode tries to maintain the airspeed present
at mode engagement. This mode does not affect stick inputs and the
pilot has complete longitudinal and lateral control, however, the
pilot has no throttle control. The system will attempt to maintain
airspeed within the limits of idle throttle to full throttle. The
Laplacian autopilot command equation is:
6 = -0.33 -,
 n I o n -VCct 1.0 + 2.0s
Where: v = airspeed (m/sec)
VC = commanded airspeed (m/sec)
This generates a throttle adjustment command which is smoothed
by a first order lag. The lag simulates turbine engine response.
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A-2.2.6 SPEED AND ALTITUDE HOLD MODE
This mode combines the previously described speed hold and
altitude hold modes. Pilot pitch and throttle inputs are ignored,
but lateral inputs are unaffected.
A-2.2.7 GLIDE SLOPE COUPLE PLUS SPEED HOLD MODE
When the pilot selects this mode, speed hold is engaged for
the aircraft's airspeed at the engagement time. In addition, the
autopilot tries to capture the glide slope if an 1LS is selected.
If the aircraft is further than 5.4 nm (10 tun) from the outer
marker, the autopilot goes into a speed and altitude hold mode until
within range. Once within range, the system calculates a reference
glidepath. This reference glidepath provides a correction to the
actual glideslope proportional to the distance to the runway.
If the aircraft height is more than 30.0 m (9b.4 ft) AGL, the
reference glidepath equation is:
GREF = G0 - 0.0012 D*GSE
Where: G0 = simulator glide slope angle:
-3.0°, -0.05235 radians
D = distance to the runway
GSE = Glide Slope error
The preceding equation acts within a limit. GREF is calculated
to provide a glidepath which corrects to the desired 3° glideslope
as a function of error and distance from the runway, hov/ever, if
the product of the glide slope error and distance from the runway
exceeds a certain value and the aircraft is below the glideslope,
the autopilot goes into an altitude hold mode.
If the aircraft is above 30.0 meters AGL and within glideslope
error limits, the pitch command correction signal is:
6 . = -0.8
col
GREF -
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The pitch command is proportional to the difference between the
reference glide path and the current horizontal velocity.
If the aircraft is below 30.0 meters AGL, the autopilot
attempts to land the aircraft and a different GREF relationship is
used:
GREF = -0.0015 ALT + 0.005
Where: ALT = height AGL (meters)
This equation produces a "flaring" glidepath to land the
aircraft. This GREF is used by the preceeding equation to obtain
6col-
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